Proof of Proposition 1, p. 34 — the marketplace's optimal fee is min{μ, v − c}
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.optimal_feeleakageoptimal-feep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platforms
In the baseline leakage game (value , cost , switching costs uniform on , ), a fee and a direct price form an equilibrium outcome of the reduced game — , is seller-optimal at , and no feasible fee followed by a seller-optimal response gives the marketplace more — if and only if
The unconstrained maximizer of is ; the cap , beyond which the seller would not list, binds when . This is the step of the proof of Proposition 1 that fixes the equilibrium fee.
Formalization Note. Negative fees are feasible in the marketplace's problem, as in (3) of the paper; the statement asserts that they are never chosen. The standing assumptions and are hypotheses.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
/-- Proof of Proposition 1, p. 34: the marketplace's profit `f (1 − f/(2μ))` is maximized at
`f = μ`; with the constraint `f ≤ v − c`, a pair `(f, pd)` is an equilibrium outcome of the
reduced game exactly when `f = min {μ, v − c}` and `pd` is an optimal direct price at `f`. -/
theorem optimal_fee (v c μ : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (f pd : ℝ) :
IsEq v c μ f pd ↔ (f = min μ (v - c) ∧ IsSOpt v c μ f pd) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89cc00…3c98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), p. 34, §8.2, Proof of Proposition 1 (argmax display)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.