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The core of the housing market is a single allocation (Roth-Postlewaite)

Proved
AGT.house_core_unique

by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymarket-designmechanism-designstable-matching

The core of the housing market consists of exactly one allocation (Theorem 10.6 of Algorithmic Game Theory; Roth–Postlewaite). For finitely many agents, each owning one house and holding a strict preference over all houses, exactly one permutation of the houses is blocked by no coalition — where a coalition blocks by redistributing the houses its own members hold, making all members weakly and some member strictly better off. The unique core allocation is the outcome of Gale's Top Trading Cycle algorithm, whose cycle-by-cycle argument is the book's proof.

A note on the rendering. Uniqueness is the full ∃!\exists!∃!: existence and uniqueness together. On the empty market the empty allocation is vacuously the unique core point, so no nonemptiness hypothesis is needed.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_agt_matching
Formal statement
namespace AGT

/-- The core of the house allocation problem consists of exactly one
allocation (Theorem 10.6 of *Algorithmic Game Theory*; Roth–Postlewaite).
With strict preferences, exactly one permutation of the houses is
unblocked — the outcome of the Top Trading Cycle algorithm, whose
cycle-by-cycle argument the book gives.  On the empty market the empty
allocation is vacuously the unique core point. -/
theorem house_core_unique {N : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N]
    (P : N → N → N → Prop) (hP : IsPrefProfile P) :
    ∃! σ : N ≃ N, ¬ HouseBlocked P σ := by
  sorry

end AGT
Source
N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press 2007, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481, Section 10.3, Theorem 10.6, pp. 254-255
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5

Read-back: house_core_unique

Setting and hypotheses. Let NNN be a finite type with decidable equality (it may be empty). A single type plays the role of both agents and objects: each i∈Ni \in Ni∈N carries a binary relation PiP_iPi​ on NNN itself (write Pi(x,y)P_i(x, y)Pi​(x,y) when the relation holds of the ordered pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y)), and an "allocation" is a bijection σ:N→N\sigma : N \to Nσ:N→N (a Lean Equiv: a map with a two-sided inverse). The only hypothesis is

  • hPh_PhP​: for every i∈Ni \in Ni∈N, the relation PiP_iPi​ is a strict total order on NNN — trichotomous (∀x y\forall x\,y∀xy, Pi(x,y)P_i(x,y)Pi​(x,y) or x=yx = yx=y or Pi(y,x)P_i(y,x)Pi​(y,x)), irreflexive, and transitive.

Note that no initial endowment appears anywhere in the statement: nothing says agent iii "owns" object iii; the indexing of objects by the agent type is the only link.

Conclusion — a unique-existence claim (∃!\exists!∃!). There exists a bijection σ:N→N\sigma : N \to Nσ:N→N that is unblocked, and every bijection with that property equals σ\sigmaσ. Precisely, it asserts the conjunction:

  1. Existence: some σ:N≃N\sigma : N \simeq Nσ:N≃N satisfies ¬ HouseBlocked(P,σ)\neg\,\mathrm{HouseBlocked}(P, \sigma)¬HouseBlocked(P,σ);
  2. Uniqueness: for every σ′:N≃N\sigma' : N \simeq Nσ′:N≃N, if ¬ HouseBlocked(P,σ′)\neg\,\mathrm{HouseBlocked}(P, \sigma')¬HouseBlocked(P,σ′) then σ′=σ\sigma' = \sigmaσ′=σ. Equality here is equality of Equivs, which amounts to the two bijections agreeing as functions on every point of NNN.

Unfolding the blocking notion. HouseBlocked(P,σ)\mathrm{HouseBlocked}(P, \sigma)HouseBlocked(P,σ) says: there exist a set S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N and a bijection τ:N→N\tau : N \to Nτ:N→N such that

  • SSS is nonempty;
  • τ\tauτ maps SSS into SSS (∀i∈S, τ(i)∈S\forall i \in S,\ \tau(i) \in S∀i∈S, τ(i)∈S; stated as "into", though on a finite type an injective self-map of SSS into SSS is automatically onto SSS);
  • every member weakly gains: ∀i∈S\forall i \in S∀i∈S, τ(i)=σ(i)\tau(i) = \sigma(i)τ(i)=σ(i) or Pi(τ(i),σ(i))P_i(\tau(i), \sigma(i))Pi​(τ(i),σ(i));
  • at least one member strictly gains: ∃i∈S\exists i \in S∃i∈S with Pi(τ(i),σ(i))P_i(\tau(i), \sigma(i))Pi​(τ(i),σ(i)).

So the theorem's object is a σ\sigmaσ admitting no such pair (S,τ)(S, \tau)(S,τ): no nonempty coalition SSS, together with a global bijection τ\tauτ keeping SSS's assignments inside SSS, gives every member of SSS either the same object or a PiP_iPi​-related-above object, with the relation holding strictly for at least one member. The blocking τ\tauτ is unconstrained off SSS, and SSS may be all of NNN — so in particular being unblocked entails there is no reallocation of everything that all agents weakly "improve" under (in the displayed sense) with one improving strictly (a Pareto-type condition as the special case S=NS = NS=N).

Edge cases. If NNN is empty, the identity is the unique bijection N≃NN \simeq NN≃N, no nonempty SSS exists so nothing is blocked, and the ∃!\exists!∃! holds trivially. If NNN is a singleton, similarly the identity is unique and unblocked (irreflexivity kills any strict gain). The uniqueness half is a genuine assertion for larger NNN: the theorem claims there are never two distinct unblocked bijections, for any profile of strict total orders.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Sep 13, 2026

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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