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The VCG auction as a cooperative game, Chapter 15: coalitional value functions, the combinatorial auction value, the core, the VCG payoff vector, bidder dominance and bidder-submodularity

Definition
SupplyChainTheory_auctions

by naimengye · Sep 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionscooperative-gamesmechanism-designoperations-researchvcg

The cooperative-game view of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction in Sect. 15.4.3 of Snyder and Shen. Players are Fin (n+1): 000 is the auctioneer and 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n are the bidders.

A coalitional value function (IsCoalitionalValue V) assigns to every coalition TTT the value it can create: V(T)=0V(T) = 0V(T)=0 when the auctioneer is not in TTT, and VVV is monotone, adding players never lowers the value. For a combinatorial auction with objects Fin m and valuations viSv_{iS}viS​ of bidder iii for bundle SSS, capValue v T is the coalitional value function of the book: the optimal value of the auctioneer's allocation problem restricted to the bidders of TTT, each receiving at most one bundle, bundles pairwise disjoint, and 000 when 0∉T0 \notin T0∈/T.

The core InCore V S π of the game on a coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0 is the set of payoff vectors π\piπ with ∑k∈Sπk=V(S)\sum_{k \in S} \pi_k = V(S)∑k∈S​πk​=V(S) and V(T)≤∑k∈TπkV(T) \le \sum_{k \in T} \pi_kV(T)≤∑k∈T​πk​ for every sub-coalition T⊆ST \subseteq ST⊆S. The VCG payoff vector vcgPayoff V S of (15.23)-(15.24) gives bidder kkk its marginal contribution πˉk(S)=V(S)−V(S∖k)\bar\pi_k(S) = V(S) - V(S \setminus k)πˉk​(S)=V(S)−V(S∖k) and the auctioneer πˉ0(S)=V(S)−∑k≠0πˉk(S)\bar\pi_0(S) = V(S) - \sum_{k \ne 0} \bar\pi_k(S)πˉ0​(S)=V(S)−∑k=0​πˉk​(S). A vector is bidder dominant (BidderDominant V S π) if it lies in the core and every bidder weakly prefers it to every other core vector. VVV is bidder-submodular (BidderSubmodular V) if for every bidder kkk and coalitions 0∈S⊆S′0 \in S \subseteq S'0∈S⊆S′, V(S′∪k)−V(S′)≤V(S∪k)−V(S)V(S' \cup k) - V(S') \le V(S \cup k) - V(S)V(S′∪k)−V(S′)≤V(S∪k)−V(S).

Formalization Note The book writes the core's budget equation as a sum over the bidders, but its proofs use the sum over all players including the auctioneer, which is the standard definition and the one used here. The theorems are stated for any coalitional value function with the two properties, which capValue has (cap_value_is_coalitional), so they cover the book's auction and any monotone game with a null coalition condition.

Definition code
import Mathlib

namespace SupplyChainTheory

/-! ### The VCG auction as a cooperative game, Sect. 15.4.3 -/

/-- Players are `Fin (n+1)`: `0` is the auctioneer and `1, …, n` are the bidders. A function on
coalitions is a coalitional value function when coalitions without the auctioneer create no
value and adding players never lowers the value. -/
def IsCoalitionalValue {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ T, (0 : Fin (n + 1)) ∉ T → V T = 0) ∧ Monotone V

/-- `V(T)` for the combinatorial auction: the optimal value of the auctioneer's problem (CAP) with
the bidders restricted to `T`, each bidder receiving at most one bundle, bundles pairwise
disjoint, and `V(T) = 0` when the auctioneer is not in `T`. Bidder `i : Fin n` is player `i.succ`. -/
noncomputable def capValue {n m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (T : Finset (Fin (n + 1))) :
    ℝ :=
  if (0 : Fin (n + 1)) ∈ T then
    sSup {w | ∃ y : Fin n → Option (Finset (Fin m)), (∀ i, i.succ ∉ T → y i = none)
      ∧ (∀ i j, i ≠ j → ∀ A B, y i = some A → y j = some B → Disjoint A B)
      ∧ w = ∑ i, (y i).elim 0 (v i)}
  else 0

/-- The core `C(S, V)` of the game restricted to the coalition `S`: payoff vectors whose total
on `S` is `V(S)` and which no sub-coalition can improve upon. -/
def InCore {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) (S : Finset (Fin (n + 1)))
    (π : Fin (n + 1) → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∑ k ∈ S, π k = V S ∧ ∀ T ⊆ S, V T ≤ ∑ k ∈ T, π k

/-- (15.23)-(15.24): the VCG payoff vector `π̄(S)` of the game on `S`: bidder `k` receives
`V(S) − V(S ∖ k)` and the auctioneer the remainder. -/
def vcgPayoff {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) (S : Finset (Fin (n + 1))) (k : Fin (n + 1)) :
    ℝ :=
  if k = 0 then V S - ∑ l ∈ S.erase 0, (V S - V (S.erase l)) else V S - V (S.erase k)

/-- A payoff vector is bidder dominant on `S` if it lies in the core and gives every bidder at
least as much as every other core vector. -/
def BidderDominant {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) (S : Finset (Fin (n + 1)))
    (π : Fin (n + 1) → ℝ) : Prop :=
  InCore V S π ∧ ∀ π', InCore V S π' → ∀ k ∈ S, k ≠ 0 → π' k ≤ π k

/-- Bidder-submodularity: the marginal value of a bidder is weakly decreasing in the coalition. -/
def BidderSubmodular {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∀ k : Fin (n + 1), k ≠ 0 → ∀ S S' : Finset (Fin (n + 1)), (0 : Fin (n + 1)) ∈ S → S ⊆ S' →
    V (insert k S') - V S' ≤ V (insert k S) - V S
end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, Sect. 15.4.3 pp. 605-607 (the coalitional value function, the core, Eq. 15.23-15.24, bidder dominance, bidder-submodularity)

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