§8, p. 20 — with identical preferences every allocation is PO and none is anti-proportional
ProvedGenericBudgets.IdenticalPrefs.identical_all_po_no_antiConsider two agents with the same standard (additive, normalized, non-negative, monotone, strict) valuation and positive budgets with . Then
- every allocation is Pareto optimal, and
- no allocation is anti-proportional:
With a common additive normalized valuation the two values always add up to ("constant-sum game"): whatever one agent gains the other loses. This is the observation that reduces Theorem 8.1 to Lemma 8.2.
Formalization Note Agents are indexed . Identical preferences are the hypothesis v 0 = v 1. The page's sentence says "at most their truncated share"; the definition of anti-proportionality (p. 12), which the sentence refers to, uses the budget-proportional share, and that is what is stated. Strictness (without the identical-items exception) is needed for the first claim: with ties, two different allocations can give both agents the same values.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GenericBudgets_AlmostEqual_Setting
namespace GenericBudgets.IdenticalPrefs
theorem identical_all_po_no_anti {m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
(hv : ∀ i, GenericBudgets.AlmostEqual.IsStandardValuation (v i)) (hsame : v 0 = v 1)
(b : Fin 2 → ℝ) (hb : ∀ i, 0 < b i) (hsum : b 0 + b 1 = 1) :
(∀ σ, GenericBudgets.AlmostEqual.IsPO v σ) ∧ ∀ σ, ¬ GenericBudgets.AlmostEqual.IsAntiProportional v b σ := by sorry
end GenericBudgets.IdenticalPrefs
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.