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Proof of Theorem 4.7, p. 21 — an EFX allocation giving agent i at most 2µ_i/3 leaves exactly two positive goods to the other agent

Proved
StrategicAlloc.EFXTwoThirds.k_eq_two

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

efxfair-divisionmaximin-sharep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let two agents have additive non-negative valuations over a finite set MMM of goods, and let (A1,A2)(A_1,A_2)(A1​,A2​) be an EFX allocation. Let iii be an agent with maximin share μi>0\mu_i>0μi​>0 and vi(Ai)≤23μiv_i(A_i)\le \tfrac23\mu_ivi​(Ai​)≤32​μi​, and let j≠ij\ne ij=i be the other agent. Write S={g∈Aj:vi(g)>0}S=\{g\in A_j: v_i(g)>0\}S={g∈Aj​:vi​(g)>0}. Then

∣S∣=2,vi(Aj)=43 μi,vi(g)=23 μi  for each g∈S.|S|=2,\qquad v_i(A_j)=\tfrac43\,\mu_i,\qquad v_i(g)=\tfrac23\,\mu_i\ \text{ for each } g\in S.∣S∣=2,vi​(Aj​)=34​μi​,vi​(g)=32​μi​  for each g∈S.

This is the first step of the proof of Theorem 4.7: an EFX allocation that is no better than 23\tfrac2332​-MMS for some agent must have a very rigid shape.

Formalization Note The page states the claim for agent 1 after a "without loss of generality"; the statement is posed for an arbitrary agent iii and the other agent jjj. The hypotheses μi>0\mu_i>0μi​>0 and vi(Ai)≤23μiv_i(A_i)\le\tfrac23\mu_ivi​(Ai​)≤32​μi​ are the proof's context (p. 20: the negation of the theorem at agent iii); the page then notes vi(Ai)=23μiv_i(A_i)=\tfrac23\mu_ivi​(Ai​)=32​μi​ by Theorem 2.6.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_EFXTwoThirds_Setting
Formal statement
namespace StrategicAlloc.EFXTwoThirds

/-- Proof of Theorem 4.7 (p. 21, first paragraph): if an EFX allocation gives agent `i` at most
`2µ_i/3` and `µ_i > 0`, then the other agent's bundle `A_j` contains exactly two goods of positive
value to `i`, `v_i(A_j) = 4µ_i/3`, and each of these two goods is worth `2µ_i/3` to `i`. -/
theorem k_eq_two {m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (hv : ∀ i g, 0 ≤ v i g)
    (A : Fin 2 → Finset (Fin m)) (hA : IsAllocation A) (hEFX : IsEFX v A)
    (i j : Fin 2) (hij : i ≠ j) (hmu : 0 < StrategicAlloc.EFXFour.mu v i)
    (hle : val v i (A i) ≤ 2 / 3 * StrategicAlloc.EFXFour.mu v i) :
    ((A j).filter (fun g => 0 < v i g)).card = 2 ∧
      val v i (A j) = 4 / 3 * StrategicAlloc.EFXFour.mu v i ∧
      ∀ g ∈ (A j).filter (fun g => 0 < v i g), v i g = 2 / 3 * StrategicAlloc.EFXFour.mu v i := by sorry

end StrategicAlloc.EFXTwoThirds
Source
Amanatidis et al., Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents, arXiv:2109.08644v2, pp. 20–21, §4.2, proof of Theorem 4.7, last paragraph of p. 20 and first paragraph of p. 21
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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