Section 3, p. 67 — the equilibrium inequalities (14) for π imply the incentive-compatibility inequalities (6) for π′
ProvedMyersonBargaining.Revelation.induced_isBICincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle
Let be a choice mechanism on nonempty finite response sets for a Bayesian collective choice problem, and let be a response-plan equilibrium for , i.e. response plans satisfying (14). Then the induced direct mechanism
is Bayesian incentive-compatible:
Together with this shows , the revelation-principle half of Theorem 2.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
theorem induced_isBIC (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) {S : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (S i)] (π : C → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (σ : ∀ i, S i → A i → ℝ)
(hπ : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism π) (hσ : ∀ i, IsResponsePlan (σ i))
(heq : IsResponsePlanEq G π σ) :
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsBIC G (induced π σ) := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 67, Section 3, proof of Theorem 2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.