Proposition 5.9 -- on one-dimensional type spaces, individual rationality reduces to the lowest type
ProvedMechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat.ir_lowest_typeincentive-compatibilityindividual-rationalitymechanism-designp2o-batch-b23bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1
Let be a complete and transitive order of such that the type set is one-dimensional with respect to . Assume that there is a lowest type ( for all ) and a worst alternative ( for every ). Then an incentive-compatible direct mechanism is individually rational with outside option , i.e. for all , if and only if
This generalizes the observation of Chapters 2–4 that only the participation constraint of the lowest type binds.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MechanismDesign_IncentiveCompat_Model
Formal statement
namespace MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
/-- Proposition 5.9 (p.110). Let `R` be a complete and transitive order of `A` with `Θ`
one-dimensional with respect to `R`; let `θlo` be the lowest type (`θ ≻_R θlo` for every
`θ ≠ θlo`) and `alo` the worst alternative (`b R alo` for every `b ≠ alo`). Then an
incentive-compatible direct mechanism is individually rational with outside option `alo` if and
only if `u(q(θlo), θlo) - t(θlo) ≥ u(alo, θlo)`. -/
theorem ir_lowest_type {A Θ : Type*} [Nonempty Θ] (u : A → Θ → ℝ) (R : A → A → Prop)
(hR : IsCompleteTransitive R) (h1 : OneDimensional u R) (θlo : Θ)
(hθlo : ∀ θ : Θ, θ ≠ θlo → HigherType u R θ θlo) (alo : A)
(halo : ∀ b : A, b ≠ alo → R b alo) (M : DirectMechanism A Θ) (hIC : IsIC u M) :
IsIRWith u M alo ↔ u alo θlo ≤ u (M.q θlo) θlo - M.t θlo := by sorry
end MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
Source
Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001, p.110, Proposition 5.9, Definition 5.11
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.