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Theorem 5.1 — exact lower bounds for every number of agents

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ChoresTIE197.Main.Supplement.theorem_5_1

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorychoresmaximin-sharemechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

For every integer n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and every real α<αn\alpha<\alpha_nα<αn​, with the exact parity-dependent threshold defined above, there is a finite number mmm of chores such that every complete payment-free randomized mechanism FFF on nnn agents and mmm chores satisfies

TIE⁡+(F) ⟹ ¬MMS⁡+(α,F).\operatorname{TIE}_{+}(F)\ \Longrightarrow\ \neg\operatorname{MMS}_{+}(\alpha,F).TIE+​(F) ⟹ ¬MMS+​(α,F).

Here the subscript +++ denotes all nonnegative additive report profiles with positive total cost in each row, as in the source's positive-MMS convention. Truthfulness compares every agent's true and alternative reports remaining in this domain, with opponents fixed. The negated guarantee means there are a positive profile, an allocation of nonzero probability and an agent whose own bundle costs strictly more than α\alphaα times her actual MMS. In particular, no mechanism on the full nonnegative domain can guarantee the ratio either. The chore count is chosen before FFF; it need not work for every chore count. All real α\alphaα below the threshold are covered, including α<1\alpha<1α<1; equality with the threshold is not excluded.

This companion theorem is not used to prove the published positive goal. It combines the two-agent bound, the parity-sensitive construction of §5.2 and the uniform large-agent bound, without symmetry, envy-freeness, equal-marginal or computational assumptions.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: finite agents and chores, arbitrary nonnegative additive costs, complete payment-free randomized allocations → Fin-indexed nonnegative real singleton tables and the published PMF on complete owner maps, with cost MMS the sign dual of utility MMS; reason: finite relabeling and sign duality preserve every source instance, empty bundles, real probabilities and support-wise guarantees
  • encoding: the standing convention on p.7 assumes positive MMS for every agent → TIEOn Positive F and MMSOn Positive α F on all profiles with positive row total; reason: for nonnegative additive costs and n≥2, positive total is equivalent to positive MMS; no singleton positivity is required, and full-domain guarantees restrict to this domain
  • encoding: no mechanism guarantees the stated ratio on every finite additive chore instance → for each fixed n and real α below the threshold there exists m such that every F on n agents and m chores is obstructed; reason: the finite hard constructions choose a chore count before the candidate mechanism; negating the uniform ex-post guarantee yields some positive profile, supported allocation and violating agent
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChoresTIE197_Main_Setting
import Definitions.Def_ChoresTIE197_Main_Supplement_threshold
Formal statement
namespace ChoresTIE197.Main.Supplement

/-- Theorem 5.1, printed/PDF p.24, including every parity and n = 2.
The positive-row-total domain is the source's standing positive-MMS convention.
The hard number of chores is chosen before the candidate mechanism. -/
theorem theorem_5_1 (n : ℕ) (hn : 2 ≤ n) (α : ℝ) (hα : α < threshold n) :
    ∃ m : ℕ, ∀ F : Mechanism n m,
      TIEOn Positive F → ¬ MMSOn Positive α F := by sorry

end ChoresTIE197.Main.Supplement
Source
Zehan Lin, Biaoshuai Tao, Xiaowei Wu, Yuhao Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #859 (October 2026), Theorem 5.1, printed p.24, PDF p.24; https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/859.pdf

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