Theorem 3.3, proof, Step 2 (player 2, symmetric) —
OpenImpulseGames.Verification.step2_equilibrium_payoff_player_twoimpulse-controlstochastic-differential-gamesverification-theorem
Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 3.3 on — (3.1) with continuous on , the QVI system (3.3), (ii) and (iii) — and let . Then for every admissible realization of the candidate equilibrium , ,
The paper proves Step 2 for player 1 ("we argue as in Step 1, but here all the inequalities are equalities by the properties of ") and states that the arguments for player 2 are symmetric; this is that symmetric statement, the counterpart of ImpulseGames.Verification.step2_equilibrium_payoff.
Formalization Note. The model gives player 1 priority at simultaneous exits, so the statement is not a formal relabelling of the player-1 one and is stated separately.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ImpulseGames_Verification_Game import Definitions.Def_ImpulseGames_Verification_QVI open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology open scoped ENNReal NNReal
Formal statement
namespace ImpulseGames.Verification
/-- Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.3, player 2 (the symmetric case): under the hypotheses of
Theorem 3.3, for every admissible realization `Y` of `(φ_1^*, φ_2^*)`,
`V_2(x) = J^2(x; φ_1^*, φ_2^*)`. -/
theorem step2_equilibrium_payoff_player_two {d k : ℕ} {Ω : Type*} [m : MeasurableSpace Ω]
(P : Measure Ω) (𝔽 : Filtration ℝ≥0 m) (W : ℝ≥0 → Ω → (Fin k → ℝ))
(hW : IsBrownianBasis P 𝔽 W) (G : Game d k) (hG : G.Standing)
(V : Player → State d → ℝ) (δ : (i : Player) → State d → G.Imp i)
(hV : VerificationHypotheses G V δ) (x : State d) (hx : x ∈ G.S)
(Y : ℕ → ℝ≥0 → Ω → State d) (hY : IsAdmissible P 𝔽 W G x (starProfile G V δ) Y) :
V .two x = payoff P G x (starProfile G V δ) Y .two := by sorry
end ImpulseGames.Verification
Source
Aïd et al. (2020), Math. Oper. Res. 45(1), accepted manuscript (arXiv:1605.00039v4), proof of Theorem 3.3, Step 2 (p. 12) and the sentence 'the arguments for V2 and J2 being symmetric' (p. 10)