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Theorem 5 — the Section A.1 scheme is perfectly correct and IND-CPA secure

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TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement.theorem_5

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cryptographyp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1public-key-encryptiontrapdoor-hardcore-functions

Let l:N→Nl:\mathbb N\to\mathbb Nl:N→N and let TTT be an efficient trapdoor hardcore function with hardcore range {0,1}l(λ)\{0,1\}^{l(\lambda)}{0,1}l(λ) that is perfectly correct and secure (Definitions 9 and 10). Let KEM(T)\mathrm{KEM}(T)KEM(T) be the Section A.1 scheme: keys of TTT; Enc(pk,m;r)=(Eval(pk,r),hEval(pk,r)⊕m)\mathrm{Enc}(pk,m;r)=(\mathrm{Eval}(pk,r),\mathrm{hEval}(pk,r)\oplus m)Enc(pk,m;r)=(Eval(pk,r),hEval(pk,r)⊕m) with r←Dλr\leftarrow D_\lambdar←Dλ​; Dec(sk,(ct1,ct2))=pInv(sk,ct1)⊕ct2\mathrm{Dec}(sk,(ct_1,ct_2))=\mathrm{pInv}(sk,ct_1)\oplus ct_2Dec(sk,(ct1​,ct2​))=pInv(sk,ct1​)⊕ct2​, or ⊥\perp⊥. Then

KEM(T) is an efficient PKE over {0,1}l(λ) that is perfectly correct and IND-CPA secure.\mathrm{KEM}(T)\ \text{is an efficient PKE over }\{0,1\}^{l(\lambda)}\text{ that is perfectly correct and IND-CPA secure}.KEM(T) is an efficient PKE over {0,1}l(λ) that is perfectly correct and IND-CPA secure.

No lower bound on lll is needed. This is the forward direction of Theorem 1, given by an explicit construction.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: uniform sampling from efficiently recognizable input spaces D_lambda → polynomial-time input samplers on uniform coins, with the input space their range and no recognizability condition; reason: base paper.md decision 5; every source input space is an instance, so the hypothesis class only grows; the constructions and experiments use only sampling
  • reading: Section A.1 decryption returns z XOR ct2 whenever pInv returns z → decryption also returns failure when |z| differs from |ct2|; reason: this happens only for ciphertexts outside C_lambda (ct2 not in {0,1}^{l(lambda)}); on every honest ciphertext the check is vacuous; it makes Dec output elements of M_lambda or failure, as the Section 3.2 syntax requires (SUPPLEMENT.md decision S6)
  • encoding: a PPT adversary (or pair of PPT algorithms) → one uniform reactive machine with polynomial coins, state, output and total activations (RestrictedDec.Adversary with Valid), run by the base runStage with no oracle; reason: base paper.md decision 7; either presentation simulates the other with a polynomial budget; no advice or unbounded adversaries are introduced
  • encoding: strings, pairs, inputs x = m||r, randomness and the failure symbol → bit strings, tuple-coded pairs, explicit uniform finite coin vectors, and Option for failure; reason: injective data codes; they change no instance of the source experiments
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TrapdoorHCF_CCA2_Supplement_CPA
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement

open TrapdoorHCF.CCA2

/-- Theorem 5, p.33, for the Section A.1 construction, p.32. -/
theorem theorem_5 :
    ∀ (l : ℕ → ℕ) (T : TDHF), T.IsScheme l → IsSecureTDHF l T →
      (kemPKE T).IsScheme l ∧ PKE.PerfectlyCorrect l (kemPKE T) ∧ INDCPA l (kemPKE T) := by sorry

end TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement
Source
Kanad Chakravarti, Shreyas Gupta, Bhavana Kanukurthi, Girisha Shankar, Trapdoors Beyond Inversion: Recoverable Information in Public-Key Cryptography, STOC 2027 submission #571 (October 2026; unrefereed), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/571.pdf, Theorem 5, p.33, for the construction of Section A.1, p.32

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