App. A.2(i), p. 3352 — DS_L^D − DS_L^U = ½v²((b+θL)²/D² − (2b+3θL−θH)²/U²) > 0
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.low_type_gainp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationtwo-sided-marketswelfare
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1; write and . For every uniform-pricing optimum and every discrimination optimum, the surplus of low-type sellers satisfies
This is the low-type-seller part of Proposition 2(i).
Formalization Note. The page prints the two fractions in the opposite order, which by A.2.1 and (A.7) is ; the claim is the paper's, and the identity is stated with the fractions in the order that makes it true.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem low_type_gain (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
sellerSurplusDL θL y - sellerSurplusU θL θH θL x =
1 / 2 * v ^ 2 * ((b + θL) ^ 2 / Dden b θH θL ^ 2 -
(2 * b + 3 * θL - θH) ^ 2 / Uden b θH θL ^ 2) ∧
sellerSurplusU θL θH θL x < sellerSurplusDL θL y := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3352, App. A.2(i), display DS^D_L − DS^U_L
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.