Lemma 1 — equilibrium ex post sourcing quantities and profits of the buyers
ProvedSupplierAudit.Competition.lemma_1Consider the stage-2 game in which buyer with offending suppliers has demand intercept ( if , otherwise) and unit cost , and the buyers play the linear differentiated Cournot duopoly with substitution parameter . Under the standing assumptions of the model, for each of the five scenarios with the unique pure Nash equilibrium is:
Moreover, for every realizable pair (both at most , differing by at most , in either order), the closed-form quantities and of the model are strictly positive, form a Nash equilibrium, and buyer 's equilibrium payoff equals the model's stage-2 profit
Together with uniqueness, this shows that the model's stage-2 profits are exactly the equilibrium profits of the table, the squares of the quantities.
Formalization Note The page tabulates the case and says the other case is symmetric; the second part of the statement covers both orders. Strict positivity of the quantities is the purpose of the three conditions of p. 8 and is stated explicitly.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Competition_Model
namespace SupplierAudit.Competition
theorem lemma_1 (P : Params) :
(∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 0) (unitCost P 0) (intercept P 0) (unitCost P 0) q₁ q₂ ↔
q₁ = (P.α - 2 * P.w) / (2 + P.β) ∧ q₂ = (P.α - 2 * P.w) / (2 + P.β)) ∧
(∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 0) (unitCost P 0) (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) q₁ q₂ ↔
q₁ = P.α / (2 + P.β) + (P.β * P.dM - (4 - P.β) * P.w + P.β * P.wh) / (4 - P.β ^ 2) ∧
q₂ = P.α / (2 + P.β) - (2 * P.dM + 2 * (1 - P.β) * P.w + 2 * P.wh) / (4 - P.β ^ 2)) ∧
(∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) q₁ q₂ ↔
q₁ = (P.α - P.dM - P.w - P.wh) / (2 + P.β) ∧ q₂ = (P.α - P.dM - P.w - P.wh) / (2 + P.β)) ∧
(∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) (intercept P 2) (unitCost P 2) q₁ q₂ ↔
q₁ = (P.α - P.dM) / (2 + P.β) - (2 * P.w + 2 * (1 - P.β) * P.wh) / (4 - P.β ^ 2) ∧
q₂ = (P.α - P.dM) / (2 + P.β) - ((4 - P.β) * P.wh - P.β * P.w) / (4 - P.β ^ 2)) ∧
(∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 2) (unitCost P 2) (intercept P 2) (unitCost P 2) q₁ q₂ ↔
q₁ = (P.α - P.dM - 2 * P.wh) / (2 + P.β) ∧ q₂ = (P.α - P.dM - 2 * P.wh) / (2 + P.β)) ∧
(∀ n₁ n₂ : ℕ, n₁ ≤ 2 → n₂ ≤ 2 → n₁ ≤ n₂ + 1 → n₂ ≤ n₁ + 1 →
0 < stage2q P n₁ n₂ ∧
IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P n₁) (unitCost P n₁) (intercept P n₂) (unitCost P n₂)
(stage2q P n₁ n₂) (stage2q P n₂ n₁) ∧
cournotPayoff P.β (intercept P n₁) (unitCost P n₁) (stage2q P n₁ n₂) (stage2q P n₂ n₁) =
stage2Profit P n₁ n₂) := by sorry
end SupplierAudit.Competition
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.