Section 5 — the authenticated S_pq procedure assures interactive consistency for n ≥ m
ProvedInteractiveConsistency.Authenticated.signed_procedure_assures_icLet be a finite set of processors, let be a set of private values, and let . For every nonfaulty set with and every authenticated -level scenario consistent with , assume that every processor has a non-NIL private value. Processor applies the singleton-set procedure to its own view and records an optional value for each . Then
Thus every nonfaulty processor records the actual private value of each nonfaulty originator, and all nonfaulty processors produce the same vector, including the entries for faulty originators.
Formalization Note The printed condition is retained. The theorem quantifies over every admissible ; the procedure receives neither nor the full scenario. Strings are bounded to those inspected by the -level procedure. NIL is represented by none, and the source's private values are required to be non-NIL. The authenticator's cryptographic construction and its probability guarantee are outside this theorem.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InteractiveConsistency_Authenticated_Procedure set_option autoImplicit false
namespace InteractiveConsistency.Authenticated
/-- Section 5, pp. 233–234: the authenticated-message procedure assures
interactive consistency for every `n ≥ m`. -/
theorem signed_procedure_assures_ic {α V : Type*} [DecidableEq α]
(P : Finset α) (m : ℕ) (hmn : m ≤ P.card) :
∀ N : Finset α, N ⊆ P → P.card ≤ N.card + m →
∀ σ : List α → Option V,
IsAuthScenario P σ → AuthConsistent P N m σ →
(∀ p ∈ N, ∀ q ∈ N, record m P (view σ p) p q = σ [q]) ∧
(∀ p ∈ N, ∀ p' ∈ N, ∀ r ∈ P,
record m P (view σ p) p r = record m P (view σ p') p' r) := by sorry
end InteractiveConsistency.Authenticated
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.