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Theorem 3, PDF p. 5 — on m = 2 identical links every Nash equilibrium has social cost ≤ (3/2)·opt

Proved
WorstCaseEq.Identical.theorem3_price_of_anarchy_two_links

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

load-balancingmakespannash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Let nnn agents with positive traffics w1,…,wnw_1,\dots,w_nw1​,…,wn​ each send their traffic over one of two identical parallel links, choosing the link at random with probabilities pi1,pi2p_i^1,p_i^2pi1​,pi2​, independently of each other. Let ppp be a Nash equilibrium: no agent can lower its expected cost, the expected traffic on the link it uses, by changing its probabilities unilaterally. Let

cost=∑j1=12⋯∑jn=12∏i=1npiji max⁡j=1,2∑k: jk=jwk\mathrm{cost}=\sum_{j_1=1}^{2}\cdots\sum_{j_n=1}^{2}\prod_{i=1}^n p_i^{j_i}\,\max_{j=1,2}\sum_{k:\,j_k=j}w_kcost=j1​=1∑2​⋯jn​=1∑2​i=1∏n​piji​​j=1,2max​k:jk​=j∑​wk​

be the social cost, the expected maximum traffic over the two links, and let opt\mathrm{opt}opt be the least maximum link traffic over all assignments of the agents to the links. Then

cost ≤ 32 opt.\mathrm{cost}\ \le\ \frac32\,\mathrm{opt}.cost ≤ 23​opt.

This is Theorem 3 of the paper: the price of anarchy (coordination ratio) for any number of agents and two identical links is at most 3/23/23/2. Together with the instance of Theorem 1 (two unit agents, each uniform over the two links), which attains 3/23/23/2, it determines the price of anarchy on two identical links exactly.

Formalization Note "The price of anarchy is at most 3/23/23/2" (a bound on max⁡ cost/opt\max\,\mathrm{cost}/\mathrm{opt}maxcost/opt over equilibria) is stated as the inequality cost≤32 opt\mathrm{cost}\le\tfrac32\,\mathrm{opt}cost≤23​opt for every equilibrium, which avoids a quotient with opt=0\mathrm{opt}=0opt=0. Positive traffics are part of the paper's model. The equilibrium is the full mixed Nash condition of the published agt_games vocabulary, payoffs being minus costs. Links are Fin 2; n=0n=0n=0 is allowed and then both sides are 000.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_WorstCaseEq_Identical_Model
Formal statement
namespace WorstCaseEq.Identical

/-- Theorem 3, PDF p. 5: for any number of agents and `m = 2` identical links, every Nash equilibrium has
social cost (expected maximum link traffic) at most `3/2` times the optimum. -/
theorem theorem3_price_of_anarchy_two_links {n : ℕ} (w : Fin n → ℝ) (hw : ∀ i, 0 < w i)
    (p : Fin n → Fin 2 → ℝ) (hp : IsNash w p) :
    socialCost w p ≤ (3 / 2 : ℝ) * opt 2 w := by sorry

end WorstCaseEq.Identical
Source
Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria (journal version, 2009), PDF p. 5, Theorem 3 (proof concluded on PDF p. 6)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

  • Endorsed by carlok · Oct 16, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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