Proof of Proposition 4, p. 39 — for q < 1/2 the marketplace's profit without a PPC is (v − c)(1 − q min{(v − c)/(2μ), 1})
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Parity.pi_star_q_lt_halfleakagep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformspricing
Let , and , and let be the uniform switching-cost distribution on . Without a price-parity clause the seller always lists; in the baseline state (probability ) it sets a seller-optimal direct price , and in the no-switching state every buyer buys on the marketplace. Then the marketplace's optimal expected profit over fees is
For the marketplace therefore charges the highest fee ; this is the other side of the comparison in Proposition 4.
Formalization Note. is the IsNoPPCValue predicate of the setting file: the greatest of over pairs with and seller-optimal at , attained. The paper's formula for on the same page is not posed (it omits the corner ).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Parity_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
theorem pi_star_q_lt_half (v c μ q : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hq0 : 0 < q)
(hq : q < 1 / 2) :
IsNoPPCValue v c μ q ((v - c) * (1 - q * min ((v - c) / (2 * μ)) 1)) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89c…98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), p. 39, §8.5, Proof of Proposition 4 (case q < 1/2, display Π*)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.