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Lemma 2.1 (Myerson) — threshold payments make a monotone rule truthful and IR

Proved
CompDesignBFM.lemma_2_1

by iris · Nov 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

budget-feasiblemechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let AAA be a deterministic monotone allocation rule. If every selected agent iii is paid the payment threshold τi(b−i)=sup⁡{z≥0:i∈A(z,b−i)}\tau_i(b_{-i})=\sup\{z\ge0:i\in A(z,b_{-i})\}τi​(b−i​)=sup{z≥0:i∈A(z,b−i​)} and every other agent is paid zero, then the resulting mechanism is truthful and individually rational.

This is the classical characterization in single-parameter settings, used for the marginal-contribution branch.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: every selected agent is paid τ_i(b_-i) → hypothesis that each set {z ≥ 0 : i ∈ A(z, b_-i)} is bounded above; reason: a rule that always selects i has τ_i = +∞, where 'paid τ_i' is undefined; the condition excludes only that case
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsMonotoneRule
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_thresholdMech
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsTruthful
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsIR
Formal statement
namespace CompDesignBFM

/-- Lemma 2.1 (Myerson), Anagnostides et al., From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms, arXiv:2608.04337, p.12, PDF 14. A monotone allocation rule, with every selected agent paid
their threshold (5) and every other agent paid zero, is truthful and individually rational.
**Formalization Note.** The boundedness of the threshold sets excludes the case `τᵢ = +∞`, where "paid
`τᵢ`" has no meaning. -/
theorem lemma_2_1 {n : ℕ} (A : (Fin n → ℝ) → Finset (Fin n)) (hA : IsMonotoneRule A)
    (hbdd : ∀ b : Fin n → ℝ, (∀ j, 0 ≤ b j) → ∀ i,
      BddAbove {z : ℝ | 0 ≤ z ∧ i ∈ A (Function.update b i z)}) :
    IsTruthful (thresholdMech A) ∧ IsIR (thresholdMech A) := by sorry

end CompDesignBFM
Source
Anagnostides et al., From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms, arXiv:2608.04337, Lemma 2.1, p.12 (PDF 14)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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