§6, p. 15 — a monopsonist pays wage 0: the startup earns v_s, the acquirer v_a
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo.monopsony_wage_zeroConsider the private-benefit model of §6: the employee's benefit at the startup is , her outside option is worth , and , .
Suppose the startup is a monopsonist and offers wage . A type- employee stays exactly when , so the startup's expected profit is
Then:
- for every , the wage (hiring only types with benefit at least ) yields ;
- ;
- every wage yields , so is the unique optimal wage.
Likewise, a monopsonistic acquirer offering wage (the employee has no benefit at the acquirer and accepts iff ) earns at and strictly less at every .
This is what makes Lemma 2 of the paper apply to acquihiring with wage floor : the startup's stand-alone profit is , the price an acquisition must beat, and after the acquisition the employee is paid .
Formalization Note The optimization ranges over all real wages, not only the page's ; uniqueness of the maximizer is the page's "it follows that the startup would set a wage of ".
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_PrivateInfo_Model
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
theorem monopsony_wage_zero (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
(∀ c ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) P.B, monoProfitS P (-c) = (P.vs + c) * (P.B - c) / P.B) ∧
monoProfitS P 0 = P.vs ∧ (∀ y : ℝ, y ≠ 0 → monoProfitS P y < P.vs) ∧
monoProfitA P 0 = P.va ∧ (∀ x : ℝ, x ≠ 0 → monoProfitA P x < P.va) := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.