p. 8876, discussion of Lemma 8(b.1) — expected real followers, hence advertising revenue, are higher under pooling
ProvedFakeAccounts.Platform.pool_revenue_geadvertising-revenuep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformsignaling
For every antifake effort , the expected number of real followers paid for, computed from (10)–(12), is at least as large under the pooling equilibrium as under the costly separating equilibrium, and strictly larger when the following cost is positive:
Since the advertising revenue is and the platform's share is , both are higher under pooling.
Formalization Note The paper says "higher"; the weak inequality covers (possible at when ), where the two coincide, and the strict one holds whenever .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FakeAccounts_Platform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace FakeAccounts.Platform
/-- p. 8876, discussion of Lemma 8(b.1): the expected number of real followers, hence the
advertising revenue, is higher under pooling than under costly separation (strictly when c > 0). -/
theorem pool_revenue_ge (P : Params) (hP : Standing P) :
∀ d, 0 ≤ d → expReal P .csep d ≤ expReal P .pool d ∧
(0 < cost P d → expReal P .csep d < expReal P .pool d) := by sorry
end FakeAccounts.Platform
Source
Huang and Liu, Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts, Management Science 71(10), 2025, p. 8876, paragraph after Lemma 8 ("Therefore, the advertising revenue … is higher under a pooling equilibrium")
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.