p. 159 — on a compact convex S ∋ 0 with a point where both gain, u₁u₂ has exactly one maximizer in the first quadrant
ProvedNashBargainingProblem.Axiomatic.nash_product_maximizer_exists_uniqueLet be a set of utility pairs , where the anticipation of no cooperation has been given utility to both players. Assume that is compact and convex, that it contains the origin , and that there is a possibility that both individuals could gain: some has and .
Then there is exactly one point with and that maximizes the product over the part of in the closed first quadrant, strictly:
This is the first step of Nash's proof: the point the axioms will single out exists (by compactness) and is unique (by convexity).
Formalization Note The paper's "first quadrant" is the closed quadrant , and "the point where is maximized" is read as the strict maximizer, in the form used by the goal theorem. The positivity is not written in the sentence; it follows from the point where both gain (p. 158) and is stated explicitly because the next step of the proof rescales to .
import Mathlib
namespace NashBargainingProblem.Axiomatic
theorem nash_product_maximizer_exists_unique (S : Set (ℝ × ℝ))
(hS_compact : IsCompact S) (hS_convex : Convex ℝ S) (hS_zero : ((0 : ℝ), (0 : ℝ)) ∈ S)
(hS_gain : ∃ s ∈ S, 0 < s.1 ∧ 0 < s.2) :
∃! p : ℝ × ℝ, p ∈ S ∧ 0 < p.1 ∧ 0 < p.2 ∧
∀ s ∈ S, 0 ≤ s.1 → 0 ≤ s.2 → s ≠ p → s.1 * s.2 < p.1 * p.2 := by sorry
end NashBargainingProblem.Axiomatic
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.