Section III — vertical integration of successive monopolies lowers the final price and raises output, aggregate profit and consumers' surplus
ProvedSpenglerVertical.DoubleMarginalization.vertical_integration_benefits_producer_and_consumerConsider three successive stages of production with fixed proportions (one unit of each stage's product per unit of the next) and constant unit variable costs . Let be a non-increasing demand curve for the final product . Stage A sells to stage B at price and stage B sells to stage C at price , each with a positive "monopolistic" profit per unit:
Without integration, stage C has unit cost and charges a profit-maximizing price at that cost; it sells units, and every stage handles the same units. A vertically integrated firm has unit cost and charges a profit-maximizing price at that cost, selling . Assume is differentiable at and . Then
- the integrated firm lowers the price: ;
- output rises: ;
- aggregate "profit" (return above variable expense) rises:
- consumers' (Marshallian) surplus rises, by at least :
Since , the left side of item 3 is the chain's aggregate profit . This is Spengler's conclusion that "vertical integration, under the conditions assumed, … benefits both producer and consumer": the integrated firm evades the surcharges imposed upstream, which is the double-marginalization argument against treating vertical integration as illegal per se.
Formalization Note The paper argues on Figure 1 and asserts the result "under all cases conceivable … within the framework here employed"; the statement is for an arbitrary non-increasing demand curve and arbitrary transfer prices with positive markups (, need not themselves be profit-maximizing). Prices range over . Two readings are added: differentiability of at (the paper's marginal-revenue reasoning presupposes it; without it a kinked demand curve can leave the price unchanged) and (the chain trades). The weak versions () of items 2 and 3 need neither; the weak version of item 1 still needs (if every price is profit-maximizing). No linearity, concavity or uniqueness of maximizers is assumed.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SpenglerVertical_DoubleMarginalization_Model
namespace SpenglerVertical.DoubleMarginalization
theorem vertical_integration_benefits_producer_and_consumer
(D : ℝ → ℝ) (hD : Antitone D)
(Va Vb Vc Pa Pb Pc Pc' : ℝ)
(hRa : 0 < Pa - Va) (hRb : 0 < Pb - (Vb + Pa))
(hPc : IsProfitMax D (Vc + Pb) Pc)
(hPc' : IsProfitMax D (Va + Vb + Vc) Pc')
(hdiff : DifferentiableAt ℝ D Pc) (hQ : 0 < D Pc) :
Pc' < Pc ∧
D Pc < D Pc' ∧
(Pa - Va) * D Pc + (Pb - (Vb + Pa)) * D Pc + (Pc - (Vc + Pb)) * D Pc
< (Pc' - (Va + Vb + Vc)) * D Pc' ∧
D Pc * (Pc - Pc') ≤ ∫ x in Pc'..Pc, D x ∧
0 < ∫ x in Pc'..Pc, D x := by sorry
end SpenglerVertical.DoubleMarginalization
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.