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Condorcet destructive partition-of-voters criterion is decidable in polynomial time

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HHRControl.PV.condorcet_dc_criterion_mem_P

by martelus trismortuus · Nov 18, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

computational-complexityelection-controlsocial-choice

Let C={0,…,m−1}C=\{0,\dots,m-1\}C={0,…,m−1} be the candidates, c∈Cc\in Cc∈C a distinguished candidate and VVV a list of nnn voters with strict rankings. Say that (C,c,V)(C,c,V)(C,c,V) satisfies the Condorcet dethroning criterion if there are candidates d1,d2≠cd_1,d_2\neq cd1​,d2​=c (possibly equal) such that

#{v:v ranks c above both d1 and d2}  ≤  #{v:v ranks d1 or d2 above c}.\#\{v : v \text{ ranks } c \text{ above both } d_1 \text{ and } d_2\} \;\le\; \#\{v : v \text{ ranks } d_1 \text{ or } d_2 \text{ above } c\}.#{v:v ranks c above both d1​ and d2​}≤#{v:v ranks d1​ or d2​ above c}.

For d1≠d2d_1\ne d_2d1​=d2​ this is the paper's inequality (4.2), Wc−Lc≤Sa+SbW_c - L_c \le S_a + S_bWc​−Lc​≤Sa​+Sb​; taking d1=d2=dd_1=d_2=dd1​=d2​=d it says that ccc does not strictly beat ddd, which covers the paper's trivial case where ccc is not the Condorcet winner. By the proof of Theorem 4.20, the criterion holds exactly when ccc can be made not the unique winner by partition of voters (in either tie-handling model).

Claim. The set of binary codes electionCode of the instances (C,c,V)(C,c,V)(C,c,V) satisfying the criterion is in P: some one-tape Turing machine decides it in polynomial time. (The paper's algorithm loops over all pairs d1,d2d_1,d_2d1​,d2​ and counts the four voter types, which takes time polynomial in mmm and nnn.)

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CookPvsNP_defs
import Definitions.Def_ProjSchedTW_Complexity_Encoding
import Definitions.Def_HHRControl_PV_Elections
import Definitions.Def_HHRControl_PV_Languages
Formal statement
namespace HHRControl.PV

open CookPvsNP ProjSchedTW.Complexity Finset

/-- The polynomial-time test behind Theorem 4.20 (Hemaspaandra–Hemaspaandra–Rothe, p. 18,
inequality (4.2)): the codes of the Condorcet elections `(C, c, V)` for which some `d₁ d₂ ≠ c`
have at most as many voters ranking `c` above both `d₁` and `d₂` as voters ranking `d₁` or `d₂`
above `c` form a language in P. -/
theorem condorcet_dc_criterion_mem_P :
    { w : List BSym | ∃ (m n : ℕ) (c : Fin m) (P : Fin n → Ranking m),
        (∃ d₁ d₂ : Fin m, d₁ ≠ c ∧ d₂ ≠ c ∧
          (univ.filter fun v => P v c < P v d₁ ∧ P v c < P v d₂).card ≤
            (univ.filter fun v => P v d₁ < P v c ∨ P v d₂ < P v c).card) ∧
        w = electionCode condorcet c P } ∈ CookPvsNP.P BSym := by sorry

end HHRControl.PV
Source
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra & Rothe, Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative, Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007), arXiv:cs/0507027v5, p. 18, proof of Theorem 4.20 (stages 1-3 and inequality (4.2))

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