Lemma 7, p. 34 — under the break-even contract terms, for δ < λ < 1: λ³ > (λ−τ)³/(1−τ)³ > (λ−δ)²(λ+2δ)/((1−δ)²(1+2δ))
ProvedTokenFinance.MoralHazard.lemma_7corporate-financemoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1token-financing
Let , , , let and be the break-even debt face value and token pre-sale at , and set , . For every with ,
Together with Propositions 5–7, the debt incentive constraint (24) is the least restrictive, followed by the token constraint (29) and then the equity constraint (20).
Formalization Note The contract-term hypotheses are essential: as a bare inequality for arbitrary the second inequality is false (e.g. , , ). The proof (p. 45, (60)) uses , which holds for the contract terms (Lemma 6). is a free number in ; every such number is for some .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TokenFinance_Debt_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TokenFinance.MoralHazard
/-- Lemma 7 (p. 34), (31): for the break-even debt and token contract terms at `θh`, with
`δ = 2√D/(θh − c)`, `τ = 2t/(θh − c)` and any `λ` with `δ < λ < 1`,
`λ³ > (λ − τ)³/(1 − τ)³ > (λ − δ)²/(1 − δ)² · (λ + 2δ)/(1 + 2δ)`. -/
theorem lemma_7 (c C0 θh D t δ τ lam : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcθ : c < θh) (hC0 : 0 < C0)
(hnpv : 0 < TokenFinance.Debt.npv c C0 θh) (hD : 0 ≤ D) (hBE : TokenFinance.Debt.expect θh (TokenFinance.Debt.debtInv c D) = C0)
(ht0 : 0 < t) (ht1 : t < (θh - c) / 2) (hT : TokenFinance.Debt.tokenBreakEven c C0 θh t)
(hδ : δ = 2 * Real.sqrt D / (θh - c)) (hτ : τ = 2 * t / (θh - c))
(hδl : δ < lam) (hl1 : lam < 1) :
lam ^ 3 > (lam - τ) ^ 3 / (1 - τ) ^ 3 ∧
(lam - τ) ^ 3 / (1 - τ) ^ 3 >
(lam - δ) ^ 2 / (1 - δ) ^ 2 * ((lam + 2 * δ) / (1 + 2 * δ)) := by sorry
end TokenFinance.MoralHazard
Source
Malinova & Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, SSRN 3286825 (version of June 1, 2023), p. 34 (PDF 35), Lemma 7, (31); pp. 44–45 (PDF 45–46), proof of Lemma 7, (58)–(60)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.