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Lemma 2.1 (Weak Duality)

Proved
InfoRelax.IdealPenalty.lemma_2_1_weak_duality

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

dualitydynamic-programminginformation-relaxationp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let αF∈AF\alpha_F\in\mathcal A_{\mathbb F}αF​∈AF​ be a nonanticipative policy, z∈ZFz\in\mathcal Z_{\mathbb F}z∈ZF​ a dual feasible penalty, and G\mathbb GG a relaxation of F\mathbb FF. Assume that E[r(α)]\mathbb E[r(\alpha)]E[r(α)] exists for every policy α\alphaα. Then

E[r(αF)]≤sup⁡αG∈AGE[r(αG)−z(αG)].(4)\mathbb E[r(\alpha_F)]\le\sup_{\alpha_G\in\mathcal A_{\mathbb G}}\mathbb E[r(\alpha_G)-z(\alpha_G)].\qquad(4)E[r(αF​)]≤αG​∈AG​sup​E[r(αG​)−z(αG​)].(4)

Any information relaxation combined with any dual feasible penalty therefore bounds the value of every nonanticipative policy, and hence the optimal value of the primal DP, from above. The statement holds for an arbitrary feasible set of action sequences and an arbitrary total reward.

Formalization Note The supremum is taken in the extended reals.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_InfoRelax_IdealPenalty_Framework

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace InfoRelax.IdealPenalty

/-- **Lemma 2.1 (Weak Duality)**, Brown, Smith & Sun (2010), Oper. Res., DOI
10.1287/opre.1090.0796, p. 3, eq. (4).

If `α_F ∈ 𝒜_𝔽` and `z ∈ 𝒵_𝔽` are primal and dual feasible and `𝔾` is a relaxation of `𝔽`, then
`𝔼[r(α_F)] ≤ sup_{α_G ∈ 𝒜_𝔾} 𝔼[r(α_G) − z(α_G)]`.

**Formalization Note.** General framework of §2.1–§2.2: any feasible set `A`, any total reward
`r`, any measurable action type. `hr` is the standing convention that `𝔼[r(α)]` exists for every
policy; the right side is the `EReal` supremum `dualBound`. -/
theorem lemma_2_1_weak_duality {Ω X : Type*} [mΩ : MeasurableSpace Ω] [MeasurableSpace X]
    {T : ℕ} (μ : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (A : Set (Fin (T + 1) → X))
    (𝔽 𝔾 : Filtration (Fin (T + 1)) mΩ) (r : (Fin (T + 1) → X) → Ω → ℝ)
    (hr : RewardIntegrable μ A r) (h𝔾 : IsRelaxation 𝔽 𝔾)
    (α : Ω → Fin (T + 1) → X) (hα : α ∈ adaptedPolicies A 𝔽)
    (z : (Fin (T + 1) → X) → Ω → ℝ) (hz : z ∈ dualFeasible μ A 𝔽) :
    ((∫ ω, r (α ω) ω ∂μ : ℝ) : EReal) ≤ dualBound μ A 𝔾 r z := by sorry

end InfoRelax.IdealPenalty
Source
Brown, Smith & Sun, Information Relaxations and Duality in Stochastic Dynamic Programs, Oper. Res. (Articles in Advance, 2010), DOI 10.1287/opre.1090.0796, p. 3, Lemma 2.1, eq. (4)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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