§3.2, p. 9 — the benchmark equilibrium: u^N = 1/(3k), w^N = 2/(9k), q^N_R = 1/6, Π^N_M = 1/(54k), Π^N_R = 1/(108k)
ProvedQualityEncroach.Uniform.benchmark_equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1product-qualitysubgame-perfect-equilibriumsupply-chain
Let . The benchmark game without a direct channel (§3.2) has a subgame perfect equilibrium, and in every subgame perfect equilibrium the manufacturer chooses
the retailer orders , and the equilibrium profits are
These are the benchmark profits against which encroachment is measured in Proposition 1(iii).
Formalization Note. The existence clause shows that the constants and used in the statement of Proposition 1(iii) are the profits of an actual benchmark equilibrium.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Uniform_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.Uniform
/-- §3.2, p. 9: the benchmark game has a subgame perfect equilibrium, and every one has
`u^N = 1/(3k)`, `w^N = 2/(9k)`, `q^N_R = 1/6`, `Π^N_M = 1/(54k)` and `Π^N_R = 1/(108k)`. -/
theorem benchmark_equilibrium (k : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) :
(∃ τ : BenchProfile, IsBenchSPE k τ) ∧
∀ τ : BenchProfile, IsBenchSPE k τ →
τ.u = 1 / (3 * k) ∧ τ.w = 2 / (9 * k) ∧ τ.path.qR = 1 / 6 ∧
benchMfrPayoff k τ.path = 1 / (54 * k) ∧
benchRetailerPayoff τ.path = 1 / (108 * k) := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.Uniform
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 9, §3.2, display after (2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.