Repression-effectiveness cutoff for retail violence
ProvedDrugMarket.violence_effectiveness_cutoffeconomicsgame-theoryindustrial-organization
. Retail violence increases with repression effectiveness iff , decreases iff , and is stationary iff .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_drug_market_model import Definitions.Def_drug_market_equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace DrugMarket theorem violence_effectiveness_cutoff (q s v_r g : ℝ) (hq : q ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) (hs : 0 < s) (hvr : 0 < v_r) (hg : 0 ≤ g) : deriv (fun qq => violenceBR qq s v_r g) q = -(v_r * (1 + Real.log (qHat q s v_r g))) / (q * (Real.log q)^2) ∧ (deriv (fun qq => violenceBR qq s v_r g) q > 0 ↔ Real.log (qHat q s v_r g) < -1) ∧ (deriv (fun qq => violenceBR qq s v_r g) q < 0 ↔ -1 < Real.log (qHat q s v_r g)) ∧ (deriv (fun qq => violenceBR qq s v_r g) q = 0 ↔ Real.log (qHat q s v_r g) = -1) := by sorry end DrugMarket
Source
Gilberto José Nogueira Júnior, *Mercado de Drogas e Repressão: Efeitos da Intervenção Governamental sobre a Violência gerada pelo Mercado de Drogas numa Rede Verticalmente Relacionada*, MSc dissertation, UFPE/PIMES, 2019, Chapter 3. Eq. (3.36), Appendix (A.1)–(A.2).
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.