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Proof of Lemma 20, p. 47 — at a fixed point, u_i((i:j); x_−i) = t_i on the support and ≤ t_i off it

Proved
FixpNash.DivFree.fixedPoint_purePayoff

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

fixed-pointgame-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Consider a finite game in which every player has a nonempty set of pure strategies, and let x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ be a mixed profile with GI(x)=xG_I(x)=xGI​(x)=x, that is, xij=max⁡(xij+ui((i:j);x−i)−ti,0)x_{ij}=\max(x_{ij}+u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})-t_i,0)xij​=max(xij​+ui​((i:j);x−i​)−ti​,0) for all i,ji,ji,j. Then for every player iii and every j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​:

xij>0  ⟹  ui((i:j);x−i)=ti,xij=0  ⟹  ui((i:j);x−i)≤ti.x_{ij}>0\implies u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})=t_i,\qquad\qquad x_{ij}=0\implies u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})\le t_i .xij​>0⟹ui​((i:j);x−i​)=ti​,xij​=0⟹ui​((i:j);x−i​)≤ti​.

This is the first half of the proof of Lemma 20: at a fixed point, all strategies in a player's support earn the same payoff tit_iti​ and no strategy earns more, which makes xxx a Nash equilibrium.

Formalization Note. tit_iti​ is the threshold of the definition file, the unique root of fi,x(t)=1f_{i,x}(t)=1fi,x​(t)=1. Every strategy set is assumed nonempty, the paper's tacit assumption.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_DivFree_Map
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.DivFree

/-- Proof of Lemma 20, p. 47: at a fixed point `x ∈ Δ` of `G_I`,
`uᵢ((i:j); x₋ᵢ) = tᵢ` whenever `xᵢⱼ > 0` and `uᵢ((i:j); x₋ᵢ) ≤ tᵢ` whenever `xᵢⱼ = 0`. -/
theorem fixedPoint_purePayoff {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ)
    (hS : ∀ i, Nonempty (S i)) (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ)
    (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x) (hfix : G u x = x) :
    ∀ (i : ι) (j : S i),
      (0 < x i j → DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j = threshold u x i) ∧
        (x i j = 0 → DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j ≤ threshold u x i) := by sorry

end FixpNash.DivFree
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), Section 4, proof of Lemma 20, p. 47
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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