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Theorem 11 — a lossy TDHF from lossy encryption (Section C.2)

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TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement.theorem_11

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cryptographyp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptiontrapdoor-hardcore-functions

Let lll be a public polynomial length and let PPP be an efficient lossy public-key encryption scheme with message space {0,1}l(λ)\{0,1\}^{l(\lambda)}{0,1}l(λ) that is perfectly correct and secure (Definition 7). Then the Section C.2 function LTDHFl(P)\mathrm{LTDHF}_l(P)LTDHFl​(P), with input x=m∥rx=m\Vert rx=m∥r uniform, Eval(pk,x)=Enc(pk,m;r)\mathrm{Eval}(pk,x)=\mathrm{Enc}(pk,m;r)Eval(pk,x)=Enc(pk,m;r), hEval(pk,x)=m\mathrm{hEval}(pk,x)=mhEval(pk,x)=m, pInv=Dec\mathrm{pInv}=\mathrm{Dec}pInv=Dec and the key generators of PPP, satisfies

LTDHFl(P) is an efficient LTDHF with hardcore length l(λ) that is perfectly correct, mode indistinguishable and statistically lossy.\mathrm{LTDHF}_l(P)\ \text{is an efficient LTDHF with hardcore length }l(\lambda)\text{ that is perfectly correct, mode indistinguishable and statistically lossy}.LTDHFl​(P) is an efficient LTDHF with hardcore length l(λ) that is perfectly correct, mode indistinguishable and statistically lossy.

This is the reverse half of Theorem 9.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: a message or hardcore length l(lambda), polynomially bounded → a public polynomial parameter l (RestrictedDec.PolyParam), computable in unary in uniform polynomial time; reason: base paper.md decision 4; the Section A.2/C.2 evaluation parses x = m||r at l(lambda) and the reduction samples m0, m1 from {0,1}^{l(lambda)}, which a polynomial-time machine can do only when it can compute l(lambda)
  • reading: Definition 8/12 syntax with efficiently recognizable D_lambda and R_lambda for the constructed function → IsScheme of the constructed function asserts efficiency, the uniform sampler and output lengths but no recognizability of D_lambda or R_lambda; reason: as in the base Theorem 8: the theorem claims correctness and security; pInv is total on strings, the PKE syntax gives no recognizable randomness space, and recognizability is never used
  • encoding: Eval and hEval (resp. Enc) are one algorithm used with public keys generated in either mode, and hEval outputs an element of {0,1}^{l(lambda)} → one polynomial-time machine agrees with Eval (resp. hEval, Enc) on every key in the support of either key generator, and hEval has length l(lambda) under lossy keys too; reason: Definitions 7 and 12 state the algorithms once for both modes; pInv and Dec are required only for recoverable trapdoors
  • encoding: every lossy public key in Supp(KGen_los(1^lambda)) → losKeyGen lambda r for every lossy key coin vector r; reason: the same set of keys
  • encoding: statistical distance (1/2) sum over omega of |Pr[X = omega] - Pr[Y = omega]| → (1/2) times the real tsum over all outcomes of |p(omega) - q(omega)| for PMFs on an arbitrary type; reason: the series is absolutely summable for PMFs, so this is the same number; no finiteness of the outcome space is assumed
  • encoding: a PPT adversary (or pair of PPT algorithms) → one uniform reactive machine with polynomial coins, state, output and total activations (RestrictedDec.Adversary with Valid), run by the base runStage with no oracle; reason: base paper.md decision 7; either presentation simulates the other with a polynomial budget; no advice or unbounded adversaries are introduced
  • encoding: strings, pairs, inputs x = m||r, randomness and the failure symbol → bit strings, tuple-coded pairs, explicit uniform finite coin vectors, and Option for failure; reason: injective data codes; they change no instance of the source experiments
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TrapdoorHCF_CCA2_Supplement_Lossy
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement

open TrapdoorHCF.CCA2

/-- Theorem 11, p.53, for the Section C.2 construction, p.50. `Secure` includes
recoverable-mode perfect correctness (Definition 16). -/
theorem theorem_11 :
    ∀ (l : ℕ → ℕ) (P : LPKE), RestrictedDec.PolyParam l → P.IsScheme l →
      P.PerfectlyCorrect l → P.Secure l →
      (ltdhfOfLPKE l P).IsScheme l ∧ (ltdhfOfLPKE l P).Secure l := by sorry

end TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement
Source
Kanad Chakravarti, Shreyas Gupta, Bhavana Kanukurthi, Girisha Shankar, Trapdoors Beyond Inversion: Recoverable Information in Public-Key Cryptography, STOC 2027 submission #571 (October 2026; unrefereed), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/571.pdf, Theorem 11, p.53, for the construction of Section C.2, p.50

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