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Proposition 5.1 — in a two-person game, every mixed subjective equilibrium payoff is an objective mixed equilibrium payoff

Proved
Aumann1974.TwoPerson.two_person_mixed_equilibrium_objective

by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-p200ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1subjective-probability

Let GGG be a two-person game (not necessarily zero-sum): players 1,21,21,2 with finite pure strategy sets S1,S2S_1,S_2S1​,S2​, a finite outcome set XXX, an outcome function g:S1×S2→Xg : S_1\times S_2 \to Xg:S1​×S2​→X onto XXX, and utilities u1,u2:X→Ru_1,u_2 : X\to\mathbb Ru1​,u2​:X→R. Let (Ω,B,(J1,J2),(p1,p2))(\Omega,\mathcal B,(\mathcal J_1,\mathcal J_2),(p_1,p_2))(Ω,B,(J1​,J2​),(p1​,p2​)) be a randomizing structure satisfying Assumption II, and assume that the two subjective probabilities have the same null events:

(5.2)p1(B)=0  ⟺  p2(B)=0for every event B∈B.\text{(5.2)}\qquad p_1(B) = 0 \iff p_2(B) = 0\qquad\text{for every event } B\in\mathcal B.(5.2)p1​(B)=0⟺p2​(B)=0for every event B∈B.

Then for every equilibrium point s=(s1,s2)s = (s_1,s_2)s=(s1​,s2​) in mixed strategies there is an equilibrium point t=(t1,t2)t=(t_1,t_2)t=(t1​,t2​) in objective mixed strategies with the same payoff vector:

H(s)=H(t),i.e.H1(s)=H1(t) and H2(s)=H2(t).H(s) = H(t),\qquad\text{i.e.}\quad H_1(s)=H_1(t)\ \text{and}\ H_2(s)=H_2(t).H(s)=H(t),i.e.H1​(s)=H1​(t) and H2​(s)=H2​(t).

Aumann's Example 2.3 shows that with three players, pegging strategies on subjective events can yield a mixed equilibrium better for every player than any objective mixed equilibrium. This proposition shows that with two players it cannot: subjectivity alone, without correlation, adds no new equilibrium payoffs. Example 2.9 shows the hypothesis "mixed" cannot be dropped.

Formalization Note The players 1,21,21,2 are 0, 1 : Fin 2. Equilibrium points allow deviations to any strategy measurable with respect to the deviator's information. (5.2) is imposed on all B\mathcal BB-measurable events. Each coordinate of HHH is computed under that player's own subjective probability.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1974_TwoPerson_RandomizingStructure
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1974_TwoPerson_Payoffs
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1974.TwoPerson

open MeasureTheory

/-- **Proposition 5.1** (Aumann 1974, *Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies*,
J. Math. Econ. 1, p. 78, PDF p. 12): let `G` be a 2-person game (not necessarily 0-sum,
footnote 16), and assume that
(5.2) for any event `B`, `p₁(B) = 0` if and only if `p₂(B) = 0`.
Then for each equilibrium point `s` in mixed strategies, there is an equilibrium point `t` in
objective mixed strategies such that `H(s) = H(t)`.

**Formalization Note.** The two players `1, 2` are `0, 1 : Fin 2`. The game has finite pure
strategy sets `S 0`, `S 1`, a finite outcome set `X`, an outcome function `g` onto `X` and
utilities `u`; the randomizing structure `R` satisfies Assumption II (standing assumption,
p. 75). (5.2) is imposed for every `ℬ`-measurable `B` (the paper's events). An equilibrium point
(`IsEquilibrium`) is a profile of strategies against which no player gains by deviating to
**any** strategy. `s` is assumed mixed for both players; the conclusion requires `t` to be both
objective and mixed for both players. `H(s) = H(t)` is equality of payoff vectors: each player's
payoff is computed under that player's own `pᵢ`. -/
theorem two_person_mixed_equilibrium_objective {Ω X : Type*} {mΩ : MeasurableSpace Ω}
    {S : Fin 2 → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [Fintype X]
    (R : RandomizingStructure (Fin 2) Ω mΩ) (hII : AssumptionII R)
    (g : (∀ i, S i) → X) (hg : Function.Surjective g) (u : Fin 2 → X → ℝ)
    (h52 : ∀ B : Set Ω, MeasurableSet[mΩ] B → (R.p 0 B = 0 ↔ R.p 1 B = 0))
    (s : ∀ i, Ω → S i) (hs : IsEquilibrium R u g s) (hmix : ∀ i, IsMixed R i (s i)) :
    ∃ t : ∀ i, Ω → S i, IsEquilibrium R u g t ∧
      (∀ i, IsObjectiveStrategy R (t i) ∧ IsMixed R i (t i)) ∧
      (fun i => H R u g s i) = fun i => H R u g t i := by sorry

end Aumann1974.TwoPerson
Source
R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 67–96, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8, p. 78 (PDF p. 12), Proposition 5.1 with condition (5.2) and footnote 16; proof p. 79 (PDF p. 13)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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