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Theorem 13.3: in the rationing game both retailers order more than the newsvendor quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗

Proved
SupplyChainTheory.rationing_nash_inflates

by naimengye · Sep 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bullwhip-effectgame-theorynewsvendoroperations-researchsupply-chain

Theorem 13.3. Two identical retailers face single-period demand with a continuous, strictly increasing distribution function FFF on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), holding cost h>0h > 0h>0 per unit left over and stockout penalty p>0p > 0p>0 per lost sale, so that the newsvendor quantity Q∗Q^{*}Q∗ satisfies F(Q∗)=p/(h+p)F(Q^{*}) = p/(h+p)F(Q∗)=p/(h+p). The supply is A1A_1A1​ with probability rrr, 0<r<10 < r < 10<r<1, and unlimited otherwise, with 0<A1<2Q∗0 < A_1 < 2Q^{*}0<A1​<2Q∗; a shortage is rationed pro rata to the orders, retailer 1 receiving A1Q1/(Q1+Q2)A_1Q_1/(Q_1 + Q_2)A1​Q1​/(Q1​+Q2​). Retailer 1's expected cost is (13.14),

g1(Q1)=(1−r) nv(Q1)+r nv(A1Q1Q1+Q2),g_1(Q_1) = (1 - r)\,\mathrm{nv}(Q_1) + r\,\mathrm{nv}\Big(\frac{A_1Q_1}{Q_1 + Q_2}\Big),g1​(Q1​)=(1−r)nv(Q1​)+rnv(Q1​+Q2​A1​Q1​​),

with nv\mathrm{nv}nv the newsvendor cost. If Q>0Q > 0Q>0 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is QQQ minimizes g1g_1g1​ over positive order quantities when retailer 2 orders Q2=QQ_2 = QQ2​=Q, then

Q  >  Q∗.Q \;>\; Q^{*}.Q>Q∗.

In the presence of possible shortages, order quantities are inflated. The book's proof sets the derivative of (13.14) to zero at the symmetric point: the rationed term contributes rA1[(h+p)F(A1/2)−p]/(4Q)rA_1[(h+p)F(A_1/2) - p]/(4Q)rA1​[(h+p)F(A1​/2)−p]/(4Q), which is negative because A1/2<Q∗A_1/2 < Q^{*}A1​/2<Q∗, so the unrationed term must satisfy (h+p)F(Q)−p>0(h+p)F(Q) - p > 0(h+p)F(Q)−p>0 (Eq. 13.15) against (h+p)F(Q∗)−p=0(h+p)F(Q^{*}) - p = 0(h+p)F(Q∗)−p=0 (Eq. 13.16), and FFF strictly increasing gives Q>Q∗Q > Q^{*}Q>Q∗. The book notes that inflated orders do not by themselves prove inflated variances; the rigorous bullwhip claim for this model is in Rong et al. (2017).

Formalization Note The demand law is a probability measure on R\mathbb{R}R whose distribution function is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞); the newsvendor loss is assumed integrable. The equilibrium is stated as optimality of QQQ against every positive Q1Q_1Q1​ with the other retailer fixed at QQQ.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_bullwhip
Formal statement
namespace SupplyChainTheory

theorem rationing_nash_inflates (h p r A1 Qstar Q : ℝ) (Dlaw : MeasureTheory.Measure ℝ)
    [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure Dlaw]
    (hh : 0 < h) (hp : 0 < p) (hr0 : 0 < r) (hr1 : r < 1) (hA : 0 < A1)
    (hint : ∀ y : ℝ, MeasureTheory.Integrable (fun d => h * max (y - d) 0 + p * max (d - y) 0) Dlaw)
    (hFc : Continuous (ProbabilityTheory.cdf Dlaw))
    (hFmono : StrictMonoOn (ProbabilityTheory.cdf Dlaw) (Set.Ici 0))
    (hQs0 : 0 ≤ Qstar) (hQstar : ProbabilityTheory.cdf Dlaw Qstar = p / (h + p))
    (hA2 : A1 < 2 * Qstar) (hQpos : 0 < Q)
    (hNash : ∀ Q1 : ℝ, 0 < Q1 →
      rationingCost h p r A1 Dlaw Q Q ≤ rationingCost h p r A1 Dlaw Q Q1) :
    Qstar < Q := by sorry

end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, pp. 546-548, Sect. 13.2.3, Theorem 13.3 and its proof, Eq. (13.14)-(13.16); after Lee et al. (1997a)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by naimengye · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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