Corollary 2, p. 13 — the seller's optimal (p*, q*, r*) maximizes social welfare (12)–(13)
ProvedSuReturns.PartialRefunds.corollary2_welfareStanding assumptions (Su pp. 6–7): market demand with ; consumer valuations with finite mean ; unit cost and salvage value with . Let be the distribution function of , , and the social welfare (12)–(13) under demand rule (6). Let satisfy
Then for every price , refund and stocking quantity ,
This is Corollary 2: the profit-maximizing policy of Proposition 2 also maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and seller profit, so with valuation uncertainty resolved after purchase, monopoly pricing causes no welfare loss.
Formalization Note Welfare carries the demand rule (6): at a price above the reservation price nobody buys and the welfare is . Only optimality is claimed, not uniqueness. Demand is assumed nonnegative () and stocking quantities range over : the page's demand is "a mass of infinitesimal consumers" and a "stocking quantity", and without these readings the profit is unbounded (a negative with a very negative price makes it arbitrarily large). is the page's own "" (p. 26). The valuation law is a general probability measure with integrable identity rather than a density ; follows the page's tie rule (keep iff ).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SuReturns_PartialRefunds_Model open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
namespace SuReturns.PartialRefunds
theorem corollary2_welfare (ν D : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
[IsProbabilityMeasure D] (hν : Integrable (fun v => v) ν) (hD0 : D (Set.Iio 0) = 0)
(c s : ℝ) (hs0 : 0 ≤ s) (hsc : s < c) (hcμ : c < meanValuation ν)
(qstar : ℝ) (hq : 1 - cdf D qstar = (c - s) / (reservationPrice ν s - s)) :
∀ p r q, 0 ≤ q → welfare ν D c s p q r ≤ welfare ν D c s (reservationPrice ν s) qstar s := by sorry
end SuReturns.PartialRefunds
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.