Section 5 — the conflict payoff is incentive-feasible
ProvedMyersonBargaining.NashSolution.conflict_payoff_in_FStarbargainingincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Fix a conflict choice in a finite Bayesian collective choice problem. The direct mechanism that always selects is a choice mechanism and is Bayesian incentive-compatible. Its interim payoff vector equals the conflict vector , where
Consequently . This gives the individually rational set a feasible reference point.
Formalization Note The constant mechanism is if and otherwise. The conflict vector is defined by the displayed formula (16), not as the payoff of this mechanism; that the two agree is the third conjunct, and the fourth.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
/-- Section 5, p. 68: constant conflict choice generates an incentive-feasible payoff. -/
theorem conflict_payoff_in_FStar (G : Problem ι A C) (cstar : C) :
IsChoiceMechanism (constMech (A := A) cstar) ∧
IsBIC G (constMech (A := A) cstar) ∧
V G (constMech (A := A) cstar) = conflictPayoff G cstar ∧
conflictPayoff G cstar ∈ FStar G := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 68, Section 5, after Eq. (16)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.