Theorem 4.1 — the fuzzy core of an exchange economy coincides with the set of Walras equilibria
ProvedFuzzyGames.Walras.theorem_4_1Consider an exchange economy with consumers and commodities in which every consumer has consumption set , a preference relation and an endowment set . Assume (assumption (1) of §4 and the standing assumptions of the section):
- each is closed, convex and comprehensive;
- each is a continuous, convex, complete preorder on with for ;
- no consumer is satiated;
- every contains a strictly positive vector.
A fuzzy coalition disposes of , and is in the fuzzy core if no nonzero has an allocation , , , with for all with . An allocation is a Walras equilibrium if some price satisfies and for all with , for every . Then
This is Aubin's fuzzy-coalition version of the Debreu–Scarf core equivalence theorem: in place of a limit of replica economies, it is the admission of every fuzzy coalition that shrinks the core down to the competitive allocations, for an economy with a fixed finite number of consumers.
Formalization Note. Every convention of the definitions file applies: complete preorders (the paper's "preference preordering"), closed contour sets as continuity, (1)(i) read with in the premise, strict improvement and in the fuzzy core, incomes in EReal.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_Walras_Basic
namespace FuzzyGames.Walras
/-- Theorem 4.1 (Aubin 1981, p. 6): under assumption (1), the fuzzy core of the economy
coincides with the set of Walras equilibria. -/
theorem theorem_4_1 {n l : ℕ} (E : Economy n l) (hE : E.Assumptions) :
E.fuzzyCore = E.walras := by sorry
end FuzzyGames.Walras
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.