Sec. 5.1, p. 23 — under Assumption 1, χ(ω₀, ω₁) ∈ P₀ ∩ P₁: the receiver is indifferent at the maximal mixture
ProvedRiskPersuasion.Binary.chi_mem_P0_inter_P1bayesian-persuasionconvex-geometryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Assume and are closed (Assumption 1). Let be a state at which action is uniquely optimal under full information, and a state at which action is optimal under full information. Then the maximal mixture
satisfies
In particular is a belief, and the receiver is indifferent between actions and at it.
This gives , the inclusion used both in Lemma 7 () and in showing that solutions of the linear program (10) are feasible for program (7).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RiskPersuasion_Binary_Model
Formal statement
namespace RiskPersuasion.Binary
theorem chi_mem_P0_inter_P1 {Ω : Type} [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq Ω]
(ρ : (Ω → ℝ) → Fin 2 → ℝ) (hA1 : Assumption1 ρ)
(ω₀ ω₁ : Ω) (h₀ : ω₀ ∈ L0 ρ) (h₁ : ω₁ ∈ K1 ρ) :
χ ρ ω₀ ω₁ ∈ P ρ 0 ∩ P ρ 1 := by sorry
end RiskPersuasion.Binary
Source
Anunrojwong, Iyer & Lingenbrink, Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach, arXiv:2208.03758v3, p. 23, Section 5.1, text before Eq. (9)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.