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Claim 4.9 — the telescoping prices are in A\mathcal AA, 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal, with monotone terms

Proved
BilateralProfit.claim_4_9

by iris · Nov 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bilateral-tradeonline-learningp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1posted-pricesregret-bounds

Let K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ρ\rhoρ a distribution on GK×AG_K\times\mathcal AGK​×A, and ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1] the precision of Lemma 4.8. Let (p,q)∈A(p,q)\in\mathcal A(p,q)∈A be ε\varepsilonε-optimal according to P0P_0P0​, i.e. Δρ(a⋆,(p,q))≤ε\Delta_\rho(a^\star,(p,q))\le\varepsilonΔρ​(a⋆,(p,q))≤ε. Let I0⊇⋯⊇Ih={p}I_0\supseteq\dots\supseteq I_h=\{p\}I0​⊇⋯⊇Ih​={p} be the root-to-leaf path of ppp in the seller tree, and DjD_jDj​ the buyer block of IjI_jIj​ (Algorithm 3, built with ν\nuν and ε\varepsilonε) containing qqq. Then:

  1. every price (pIj,Dj,q)(p_{I_j,D_j},q)(pIj​,Dj​​,q) of the telescoping decomposition (21), with pIj,Djp_{I_j,D_j}pIj​,Dj​​ the representative (19), lies in A\mathcal AA and satisfies Δρ(a⋆,(pIj,Dj,q))≤2ε\Delta_\rho(a^\star,(p_{I_j,D_j},q))\le2\varepsilonΔρ​(a⋆,(pIj​,Dj​​,q))≤2ε;
  2. for the trade function PPP of every valuation law on [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2, each parent-to-child term q′↦P(pIj,Dj,q′)−P(pIj−1,Dj−1,q′)q'\mapsto P(p_{I_j,D_j},q')-P(p_{I_{j-1},D_{j-1}},q')q′↦P(pIj​,Dj​​,q′)−P(pIj−1​,Dj−1​​,q′) is monotone for q′∈Dj∩Dj−1q'\in D_j\cap D_{j-1}q′∈Dj​∩Dj−1​, and the root term q′↦P(pI0,D0,q′)q'\mapsto P(p_{I_0,D_0},q')q′↦P(pI0​,D0​​,q′) is monotone for q′∈D0q'\in D_0q′∈D0​.

This makes the decomposition (21) a sum of monotone functions estimable by Claim 4.10 while querying only 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal prices.

Formalization Note Prices are grid indices; the tree, blocks and representatives are those of the SellerTree definitions. Monotone means non-decreasing or non-increasing.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: the setting of the proof of Lemma 4.8 (grid GKG_KGK​, precision ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1]) → hypotheses 0<K0<K0<K, 0<ε≤10<\varepsilon\le10<ε≤1; reason: the claim is stated inside that proof; 1/K1/K1/K needs K≥1K\ge1K≥1
  • encoding: "contained in A\mathcal AA"; "monotone in qqq" → the representative's index is at most the buyer index; MonotoneOn ∨ AntitoneOn on the buyer indices of the block intersection; reason: a grid pair is in A\mathcal AA iff its seller index is at most its buyer index
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfit_SellerTree
Formal statement
namespace BilateralProfit

open MeasureTheory

/-- **Claim 4.9**, Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi (manuscript, sha256 e91e8127…), p.26
(PDF 28), in the proof of Lemma 4.8.

Fix `ρ` and the precision `ε ∈ (0, 1]`, and let `(p, q) ∈ 𝒜` be `ε`-optimal according to `P0`
(`Δ_ρ(a⋆, (p, q)) ≤ ε`). Along the root-to-leaf path `I_0 ⊇ ⋯ ⊇ I_h = {p}` of the seller tree,
with `D_j` the buyer block of `I_j` (Algorithm 3) containing `q`:
1. every price `(p_{I_j,D_j}, q)` of the telescoping decomposition (21) lies in `𝒜` and is
   `2ε`-optimal according to `P0`;
2. for every trade function `P` (of a valuation law on `[0,1]²`), each term
   `P(p_{I_j,D_j}, ·) − P(p_{I_{j−1},D_{j−1}}, ·)` is monotone on `D_j ∩ D_{j−1}`, and the root
   term `P(p_{I_0,D_0}, ·)` is monotone on `D_0`.

**Formalization Note.** Prices are grid indices (value index`/K`); the path, the blocks and the
representatives (19) are the definitions of `SellerTree`. "Monotone" is non-decreasing or
non-increasing. -/
theorem claim_4_9 (K : ℕ) (hK : 0 < K) (ρ : Grid K × Act K → ℝ) (hρ : IsDist ρ) (ε : ℝ)
    (hε : 0 < ε) (hε₁ : ε ≤ 1) (a : Act K) (ha : gapStar ρ a ≤ ε) :
    (∀ I ∈ sellerPath K a.1.1, repAt ρ ε I a.1.2 ≤ (a.1.2 : ℕ) ∧
      gapStarPt ρ ((repAt ρ ε I a.1.2 : ℝ) / K, ((a.1.2 : ℕ) : ℝ) / K) ≤ 2 * ε) ∧
    ∀ μ : Measure (ℝ × ℝ), IsValLaw μ →
      (∀ (m : ℕ) (hm : m + 1 < (sellerPath K a.1.1).length),
        MonotoneOn
            (fun q : ℕ => Ptrade μ ((repAt ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm) a.1.2 : ℝ) / K,
                (q : ℝ) / K) -
              Ptrade μ ((repAt ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)) a.1.2 : ℝ) / K,
                (q : ℝ) / K))
            {q : ℕ | q ≤ K ∧
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).2 q =
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).2 a.1.2 ∧
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).2 q =
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).2 a.1.2} ∨
        AntitoneOn
            (fun q : ℕ => Ptrade μ ((repAt ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm) a.1.2 : ℝ) / K,
                (q : ℝ) / K) -
              Ptrade μ ((repAt ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)) a.1.2 : ℝ) / K,
                (q : ℝ) / K))
            {q : ℕ | q ≤ K ∧
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).2 q =
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m + 1]'hm).2 a.1.2 ∧
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).2 q =
              blockStart ρ ε ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).1
                ((sellerPath K a.1.1)[m]'(Nat.lt_of_succ_lt hm)).2 a.1.2}) ∧
      (MonotoneOn (fun q : ℕ => Ptrade μ ((repAt ρ ε (0, K + 1) a.1.2 : ℝ) / K, (q : ℝ) / K))
          {q : ℕ | q ≤ K ∧ blockStart ρ ε 0 (K + 1) q = blockStart ρ ε 0 (K + 1) a.1.2} ∨
        AntitoneOn (fun q : ℕ => Ptrade μ ((repAt ρ ε (0, K + 1) a.1.2 : ℝ) / K, (q : ℝ) / K))
          {q : ℕ | q ≤ K ∧ blockStart ρ ε 0 (K + 1) q = blockStart ρ ε 0 (K + 1) a.1.2}) := by sorry

end BilateralProfit
Source
Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi, Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism (manuscript, STOC 2027 submission, sha256 e91e81279505b765c7c96c219d674c0fbbbd6ca47a00da8fe228d498ca25ac87), Claim 4.9, p.26 (PDF 28); objects from Steps 1–4, pp.24–26 (PDF 26–28)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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