(20), p. 29 — the monopoly objective (5) equals (w₀ − c_v) Σ P(m_i) min{N, n*_{HV,i}} − c_f N
ProvedAVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity.eq20_simplified_objectiveautonomous-vehiclescapacity-planningnewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1ride-hailing
Consider a common-platform market with , , , , constant HV reservation earnings (), and AV costs with (Assumption 1). There are demand scenarios with potential demand masses and probabilities summing to ; every scenario is a loose market, with maximal stable pure-HV equilibrium demand and fleet size . Then for every capacity the monopoly objective (5) with the common-platform profit (251) equals
This turns the capacity problem into a newsvendor problem with underage cost and overage cost .
Formalization Note. Scenarios are indexed by Fin I (0-based). The inner maximum of (5) is a real supremum over .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AVRideHail_MonopolyCapacity_Model
Formal statement
namespace AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity
theorem eq20_simplified_objective (P : AVRideHail.PureHV.MarketParams) (ha : 0 < P.a) (hr0 : 0 < P.r)
(hr1 : P.r < 1) (ht2 : 0 < P.t2) (hV : 0 < P.V) (halpha : P.alpha = 0)
(cv cf : ℝ) (hcv : 0 < cv) (hcf : 0 < cf) (hA1 : cv + cf < P.w0)
(I : ℕ) (hI : 0 < I) (prob : Fin I → ℝ) (hprob : ∀ i, 0 ≤ prob i) (hsum : ∑ i, prob i = 1)
(m : Fin I → ℝ) (hm : StrictMono m) (hmpos : ∀ i, 0 < m i)
(hloose : ∀ i, AVRideHail.PureHV.LooseMarket P (m i))
(dstar : Fin I → ℝ) (hdstar : ∀ i, AVRideHail.PureHV.IsMaxStableEq P (m i) (dstar i))
(N : ℝ) (hN : 0 ≤ N) :
monoProfit P cv cf prob m dstar N =
profit20 P cv cf prob (fun i => AVRideHail.PureHV.nMin P (dstar i)) N := by sorry
end AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity
Source
Lian & van Ryzin, Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration, SSRN 3716491 (version of 23 August 2023), pp. 28–29, (20), with (5) on p. 10
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.