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Proposition 5, p. 21 — under semi-decentralized dispute resolution the equilibrium ransom is π(a) − π(a^n_N) or (1 − δ)(γ(π(a) − π(a^d_N)) + b)

Proved
ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec.proposition_5

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticsdispute-resolutionequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail

Consider the review-blackmail game under the semi-decentralized mechanism with timeliness γ\gammaγ, accuracy δ<1\delta<1δ<1 and penalty bbb, with genuine reviews kept, under the standing assumptions. Let

T:=1−γ(1−δ)1−δ(π(a)−π(aNn)),b‾:=(1−γ)[π(a)−π(aNs)].T:=\frac{1-\gamma(1-\delta)}{1-\delta}\big(\pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N)\big),\qquad \underline b:=(1-\gamma)\big[\pi(a)-\pi(a^s_N)\big].T:=1−δ1−γ(1−δ)​(π(a)−π(aNn​)),b​:=(1−γ)[π(a)−π(aNs​)].

The equilibrium ransom r∗r^*r∗ is the largest ransom at which settling is an equilibrium response and no other equilibrium response pays the seller more; the malicious consumer purchases iff such a ransom exceeds ppp.

  1. If b≥T>b‾b\ge T>\underline bb≥T>b​, then
r∗=π(a)−π(aNn),(6)r^*=\pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N),\tag{6}r∗=π(a)−π(aNn​),(6)

and the malicious consumer purchases if and only if p<π(a)−π(aNn)p<\pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N)p<π(a)−π(aNn​). 2. If b‾≤b<T\underline b\le b<Tb​≤b<T, then

r∗=(1−δ)(γ(π(a)−π(aNd))+b),(7)r^*=(1-\delta)\big(\gamma(\pi(a)-\pi(a^d_N))+b\big),\tag{7}r∗=(1−δ)(γ(π(a)−π(aNd​))+b),(7)

and the malicious consumer purchases if and only if p<(1−δ)(γ(π(a)−π(aNd))+b)p<(1-\delta)\big(\gamma(\pi(a)-\pi(a^d_N))+b\big)p<(1−δ)(γ(π(a)−π(aNd​))+b).

A high enough penalty makes the mechanism irrelevant to blackmail; below the threshold the ransom tracks the seller's expected loss from using the mechanism.

Formalization Note "r∗r^*r∗" is stated as IsGreatest of the set of ransoms at which settling prevails, never by its closed form. δ<1\delta<1δ<1 is added because the threshold divides by 1−δ1-\delta1−δ (at δ=1\delta=1δ=1 Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would place every bbb in case 1). The conditions involving b‾\underline bb​ are kept as printed; they come from Proposition 4, which justifies the game's restriction to sellers who keep genuine reviews ("By Proposition 4, under the assumption that b≥b‾b\ge\underline bb≥b​, it suffices to focus on the strategies ij=sn,dn,nnij=sn,dn,nnij=sn,dn,nn", p. 41). Ransoms are not restricted to r>0r>0r>0; in both cases the greatest element is positive, so the restriction would not change it.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_SemiDec_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
theorem proposition_5 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (hδ : M.δ < 1) :
    ((1 - M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) / (1 - M.δ) * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N)) ≤ M.b →
      M.bLow < (1 - M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) / (1 - M.δ) * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N)) →
      IsGreatest {r | M.SettlePrevails r} (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N)) ∧
        (M.Purchases ↔ M.p < M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N))) ∧
    (M.bLow ≤ M.b →
      M.b < (1 - M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) / (1 - M.δ) * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N)) →
      IsGreatest {r | M.SettlePrevails r}
          ((1 - M.δ) * (M.γ * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post (M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) 1 .N)) + M.b)) ∧
        (M.Purchases ↔
          M.p < (1 - M.δ) * (M.γ * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post (M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) 1 .N)) + M.b))) := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), p. 21, Proposition 5, (6), (7)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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