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The funding output under VerifyScript: the channel's funds move only with both signatures

Proved
BitcoinFunding.funding_p2wsh_spend

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip147bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetbolt3checkmultisigformal-verificationfundinglightningmultisigp2wsh

For a context with the WITNESS flag, keys of at most 520 bytes and any witness ws: verifyScript tap c [] (witnessBytes 0 (sha256 (fundingBytes pubkey1 pubkey2))) (ws ++ [fundingBytes pubkey1 pubkey2]) = true iff the program is a true value, every witness element is at most 520 bytes, and FundingSpend holds for the context's flags and the signature mission's legacyOracle of its transaction on ws.reverse. With the to_local, HTLC and anchor missions this completes the script set of a Lightning channel's on-chain life: funding, commitment outputs, HTLCs, anchors.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinFunding
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinVerify
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinScript
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
open BitcoinFunding BitcoinHtlc
open BitcoinToLocal BitcoinSig BitcoinVerify
open BitcoinScript
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinFunding.funding_p2wsh_spend (tap : BitcoinVerify.TaprootHandler) (c : BitcoinVerify.Ctx)
    (hf : c.flags.witness = true) (pubkey1 pubkey2 : Bytes) (ws : List Bytes)
    (h1 : pubkey1.length ≤ BitcoinScript.MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE) (h2 : pubkey2.length ≤ BitcoinScript.MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE) :
    BitcoinVerify.verifyScript tap c [] (BitcoinVerify.witnessBytes 0 (BitcoinSer.sha256 (BitcoinFunding.fundingBytes pubkey1 pubkey2)))
        (ws ++ [BitcoinFunding.fundingBytes pubkey1 pubkey2]) = true ↔
      BitcoinScript.castToBool (BitcoinSer.sha256 (BitcoinFunding.fundingBytes pubkey1 pubkey2)) = true ∧
      (∀ e ∈ ws, e.length ≤ BitcoinScript.MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE) ∧
      BitcoinFunding.FundingSpend (BitcoinVerify.scriptFlagsOf c.flags)
        (BitcoinSig.legacyOracle (BitcoinVerify.sigFlagsOf c.flags) c.tx c.nIn c.amount .witnessV0 (BitcoinFunding.fundingBytes pubkey1 pubkey2))
        pubkey1 pubkey2 ws.reverse := by sorry
Source
BOLT #3, Funding Transaction Output: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#funding-transaction-output; Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: EvalScript (OP_CHECKMULTISIG), ExecuteWitnessScript, VerifyWitnessProgram (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); BIP141, BIP147
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinFunding.funding_p2wsh_spend

A byte is an 8-bit word; a byte string (Bytes\mathsf{Bytes}Bytes) is a finite list of bytes; a stack is a finite list of byte strings whose first entry is the top, except where a list is explicitly said to be in "witness order" (last entry on top).

The quantified data and hypotheses

The theorem quantifies over:

  • taptaptap: an arbitrary function Ctx×(list of byte strings)×Bytes→Bool\mathrm{Ctx}\times(\text{list of byte strings})\times\mathsf{Bytes}\to\mathrm{Bool}Ctx×(list of byte strings)×Bytes→Bool (a "Taproot handler"); nothing is assumed about it;
  • ccc: a verification context, a record with fields
    • c.flagsc.\mathrm{flags}c.flags: a record of seven booleans p2sh, witness, taproot, dersig, cltv, csv, nulldummy\mathrm{p2sh},\ \mathrm{witness},\ \mathrm{taproot},\ \mathrm{dersig},\ \mathrm{cltv},\ \mathrm{csv},\ \mathrm{nulldummy}p2sh, witness, taproot, dersig, cltv, csv, nulldummy;
    • c.txc.\mathrm{tx}c.tx: a transaction, a record (version∈N, vin, vout, nLockTime∈N)(\mathrm{version}\in\mathbb{N},\ \mathrm{vin},\ \mathrm{vout},\ \mathrm{nLockTime}\in\mathbb{N})(version∈N, vin, vout, nLockTime∈N) where vin\mathrm{vin}vin is a list of inputs, each (prevout=(hash∈Bytes, n∈N), scriptSig∈Bytes, nSequence∈N, witness:list of byte strings)(\mathrm{prevout}=(\mathrm{hash}\in\mathsf{Bytes},\ n\in\mathbb{N}),\ \mathrm{scriptSig}\in\mathsf{Bytes},\ \mathrm{nSequence}\in\mathbb{N},\ \mathrm{witness}:\text{list of byte strings})(prevout=(hash∈Bytes, n∈N), scriptSig∈Bytes, nSequence∈N, witness:list of byte strings), and vout\mathrm{vout}vout is a list of outputs, each (nValue∈Z, scriptPubKey∈Bytes)(\mathrm{nValue}\in\mathbb{Z},\ \mathrm{scriptPubKey}\in\mathsf{Bytes})(nValue∈Z, scriptPubKey∈Bytes);
    • c.nIn∈Nc.\mathrm{nIn}\in\mathbb{N}c.nIn∈N (an input index; it may exceed the number of inputs);
    • c.amount∈Zc.\mathrm{amount}\in\mathbb{Z}c.amount∈Z (it may be negative);
  • the hypothesis hfhfhf: c.flags.witness=truec.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{witness}=\mathrm{true}c.flags.witness=true (the other six flags are unconstrained);
  • two byte strings k1,k2k_1,k_2k1​,k2​ (pubkey1, pubkey2), unconstrained in content, with the hypotheses ∣k1∣≤520|k_1|\le520∣k1​∣≤520 and ∣k2∣≤520|k_2|\le520∣k2​∣≤520;
  • wswsws: an arbitrary list of byte strings (possibly empty; element sizes are not bounded by any hypothesis).

Write B:=fundingBytes(k1,k2)B:=\mathrm{fundingBytes}(k_1,k_2)B:=fundingBytes(k1​,k2​), H:=SHA256(B)H:=\mathrm{SHA256}(B)H:=SHA256(B), and P:=witnessBytes(0,H)P:=\mathrm{witnessBytes}(0,H)P:=witnessBytes(0,H).

Statement

verifyScript(tap, c, [ ], P, ws ∥ [B])=true  ⟺  castToBool(H)=true ∧ (∀e∈ws, ∣e∣≤520) ∧ FundingSpend(F, O, k1, k2, reverse(ws)),\mathrm{verifyScript}\big(tap,\ c,\ [\,],\ P,\ ws\,\|\,[B]\big)=\mathrm{true} \;\Longleftrightarrow\; \mathrm{castToBool}(H)=\mathrm{true}\ \wedge\ \big(\forall e\in ws,\ |e|\le520\big)\ \wedge\ \mathrm{FundingSpend}\big(F,\ O,\ k_1,\ k_2,\ \mathrm{reverse}(ws)\big),verifyScript(tap, c, [], P, ws∥[B])=true⟺castToBool(H)=true ∧ (∀e∈ws, ∣e∣≤520) ∧ FundingSpend(F, O, k1​, k2​, reverse(ws)),

where

  • [ ][\,][] in the third argument is the empty scriptSig (an empty byte string), PPP is the scriptPubKey, and ws ∥ [B]ws\,\|\,[B]ws∥[B] is the witness: the list wswsws with BBB appended as its last element (so the witness is never empty, even when wswsws is);
  • F:=scriptFlagsOf(c.flags)=(cltv:=c.flags.cltv, csv:=c.flags.csv, nulldummy:=c.flags.nulldummy)F:=\mathrm{scriptFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags}) = (\mathrm{cltv}:=c.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{cltv},\ \mathrm{csv}:=c.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{csv},\ \mathrm{nulldummy}:=c.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{nulldummy})F:=scriptFlagsOf(c.flags)=(cltv:=c.flags.cltv, csv:=c.flags.csv, nulldummy:=c.flags.nulldummy);
  • O:=legacyOracle(sigFlagsOf(c.flags), c.tx, c.nIn, c.amount, witnessV0, B)O:=\mathrm{legacyOracle}\big(\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags}),\ c.\mathrm{tx},\ c.\mathrm{nIn},\ c.\mathrm{amount},\ \mathrm{witnessV0},\ B\big)O:=legacyOracle(sigFlagsOf(c.flags), c.tx, c.nIn, c.amount, witnessV0, B) with sigFlagsOf(c.flags)=(dersig:=c.flags.dersig, lowS:=false, strictenc:=false, witnessPubkeyType:=false)\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags}) = (\mathrm{dersig}:=c.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{dersig},\ \mathrm{lowS}:=\mathrm{false},\ \mathrm{strictenc}:=\mathrm{false},\ \mathrm{witnessPubkeyType}:=\mathrm{false})sigFlagsOf(c.flags)=(dersig:=c.flags.dersig, lowS:=false, strictenc:=false, witnessPubkeyType:=false);
  • reverse(ws)\mathrm{reverse}(ws)reverse(ws) is wswsws in reverse order.

Each piece is unfolded below.

The byte strings BBB, HHH, PPP

B=fundingBytes(k1,k2)=[0x52] ∥ pushBytes(k1) ∥ pushBytes(k2) ∥ [0x52,0xae]B=\mathrm{fundingBytes}(k_1,k_2)=[\mathtt{0x52}]\ \|\ \mathrm{pushBytes}(k_1)\ \|\ \mathrm{pushBytes}(k_2)\ \|\ [\mathtt{0x52},\mathtt{0xae}]B=fundingBytes(k1​,k2​)=[0x52] ∥ pushBytes(k1​) ∥ pushBytes(k2​) ∥ [0x52,0xae], where pushBytes(d)\mathrm{pushBytes}(d)pushBytes(d) for ℓ=∣d∣\ell=|d|ℓ=∣d∣ is: [ℓ]∥d[\ell]\|d[ℓ]∥d if ℓ<76\ell<76ℓ<76; [0x4c,ℓ]∥d[\mathtt{0x4c},\ell]\|d[0x4c,ℓ]∥d if ℓ≤255\ell\le255ℓ≤255; [0x4d]∥(ℓ as 2 LE bytes)∥d[\mathtt{0x4d}]\|(\ell\text{ as 2 LE bytes})\|d[0x4d]∥(ℓ as 2 LE bytes)∥d if ℓ≤65535\ell\le65535ℓ≤65535; else [0x4e]∥(ℓ as 4 LE bytes)∥d[\mathtt{0x4e}]\|(\ell\text{ as 4 LE bytes})\|d[0x4e]∥(ℓ as 4 LE bytes)∥d.

SHA256\mathrm{SHA256}SHA256 is the serialization file's own transcription of SHA-256 (Merkle–Damgård padding with a big-endian 64-bit bit-length, 64-round compression with the standard constants, output the eight 32-bit state words big-endian); its output always has 32 bytes.

witnessBytes(v,prog)\mathrm{witnessBytes}(v,\mathit{prog})witnessBytes(v,prog) is the byte 0x00\mathtt{0x00}0x00 if v=0v=0v=0 (else 0x50+v\mathtt{0x50}+v0x50+v) followed by pushBytes(prog)\mathrm{pushBytes}(\mathit{prog})pushBytes(prog). Hence P=[0x00,0x20] ∥ HP=[\mathtt{0x00},\mathtt{0x20}]\,\|\,HP=[0x00,0x20]∥H, a 34-byte string.

Right-hand side, first conjunct: castToBool(H)=true\mathrm{castToBool}(H)=\mathrm{true}castToBool(H)=true

castToBool(b)\mathrm{castToBool}(b)castToBool(b): false\mathrm{false}false for b=[ ]b=[\,]b=[]; for one byte [x][x][x], true iff x≠0x00x\ne\mathtt{0x00}x=0x00 and x≠0x80x\ne\mathtt{0x80}x=0x80; for x::restx::\mathit{rest}x::rest with rest≠[ ]\mathit{rest}\ne[\,]rest=[], true iff x≠0x00x\ne\mathtt{0x00}x=0x00 or castToBool(rest)\mathrm{castToBool}(\mathit{rest})castToBool(rest). For the 32-byte HHH: true iff one of its first 31 bytes is non-zero, or its last byte is neither 0x00\mathtt{0x00}0x00 nor 0x80\mathtt{0x80}0x80.

Right-hand side, second conjunct

Every element of wswsws has length at most 520520520. This is vacuously true when ws=[ ]ws=[\,]ws=[]. (Note this is a conjunct of the right-hand side, not a hypothesis of the theorem.)

Right-hand side, third conjunct: FundingSpend(F,O,k1,k2,reverse(ws))\mathrm{FundingSpend}(F,O,k_1,k_2,\mathrm{reverse}(ws))FundingSpend(F,O,k1​,k2​,reverse(ws))

By definition this is

∃ s1,s2,d∈Bytes: reverse(ws)=[ s2, s1, d ] ∧ O.checkSig(s1,k1)=some true ∧ O.checkSig(s2,k2)=some true ∧ (F.nulldummy=true⇒d=[ ]).\exists\, s_1,s_2,d\in\mathsf{Bytes}:\ \mathrm{reverse}(ws)=[\,s_2,\,s_1,\,d\,]\ \wedge\ O.\mathrm{checkSig}(s_1,k_1)=\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{true}\ \wedge\ O.\mathrm{checkSig}(s_2,k_2)=\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{true}\ \wedge\ \big(F.\mathrm{nulldummy}=\mathrm{true}\Rightarrow d=[\,]\big).∃s1​,s2​,d∈Bytes: reverse(ws)=[s2​,s1​,d] ∧ O.checkSig(s1​,k1​)=sometrue ∧ O.checkSig(s2​,k2​)=sometrue ∧ (F.nulldummy=true⇒d=[]).

Since reverse(ws)=[s2,s1,d]\mathrm{reverse}(ws)=[s_2,s_1,d]reverse(ws)=[s2​,s1​,d] iff ws=[d,s1,s2]ws=[d,s_1,s_2]ws=[d,s1​,s2​]: wswsws must have exactly three elements, in the order ddd (first), s1s_1s1​, s2s_2s2​ (last); if wswsws has any other length (including 000) the conjunct is false. F.nulldummyF.\mathrm{nulldummy}F.nulldummy is c.flags.nulldummyc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{nulldummy}c.flags.nulldummy; when it is true, ddd must be empty; otherwise ddd is arbitrary. The sizes of s1,s2,ds_1,s_2,ds1​,s2​,d are constrained only by the second conjunct.

The oracle OOO. legacyOracle(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc)\mathrm{legacyOracle}(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc)legacyOracle(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc) is the oracle whose hash fields are the concrete RIPEMD-160, SHA-1, SHA-256, Hash160=RIPEMD160∘SHA256\mathrm{Hash160}=\mathrm{RIPEMD160}\circ\mathrm{SHA256}Hash160=RIPEMD160∘SHA256 and Hash256=SHA256∘SHA256\mathrm{Hash256}=\mathrm{SHA256}\circ\mathrm{SHA256}Hash256=SHA256∘SHA256 of the serialization file; whose lock-time fields are the transaction lock-time/sequence checks for (tx,nIn)(tx,nIn)(tx,nIn) (not consulted by FundingSpend\mathrm{FundingSpend}FundingSpend); and whose checkSig(σ,π)\mathrm{checkSig}(\sigma,\pi)checkSig(σ,π) is checkSigPreTapscript(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc,σ,π)\mathrm{checkSigPreTapscript}(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc,\sigma,\pi)checkSigPreTapscript(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc,σ,π). Here sf=sigFlagsOf(c.flags)sf=\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags})sf=sigFlagsOf(c.flags), tx=c.txtx=c.\mathrm{tx}tx=c.tx, nIn=c.nInnIn=c.\mathrm{nIn}nIn=c.nIn, amt=c.amountamt=c.\mathrm{amount}amt=c.amount, v=witnessV0v=\mathrm{witnessV0}v=witnessV0, sc=Bsc=Bsc=B.

checkSigPreTapscript(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc,σ,π)\mathrm{checkSigPreTapscript}(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc,\sigma,\pi)checkSigPreTapscript(sf,tx,nIn,amt,v,sc,σ,π). Since v=witnessV0v=\mathrm{witnessV0}v=witnessV0, the script code used is sc=Bsc=Bsc=B itself (no FindAndDelete). The result is none\mathrm{none}none if checkSignatureEncoding(sf,σ)\mathrm{checkSignatureEncoding}(sf,\sigma)checkSignatureEncoding(sf,σ) is false or checkPubKeyEncoding(sf,v,π)\mathrm{checkPubKeyEncoding}(sf,v,\pi)checkPubKeyEncoding(sf,v,π) is false; otherwise some(checkECDSASignature(tx,nIn,amt,v,σ,π,sc))\mathrm{some}\big(\mathrm{checkECDSASignature}(tx,nIn,amt,v,\sigma,\pi,sc)\big)some(checkECDSASignature(tx,nIn,amt,v,σ,π,sc)).

  • checkSignatureEncoding(sf,σ)\mathrm{checkSignatureEncoding}(sf,\sigma)checkSignatureEncoding(sf,σ): true if σ=[ ]\sigma=[\,]σ=[]; else false if (sf.dersig∨sf.lowS∨sf.strictenc)(sf.\mathrm{dersig}\vee sf.\mathrm{lowS}\vee sf.\mathrm{strictenc})(sf.dersig∨sf.lowS∨sf.strictenc) and ¬isValidSignatureEncoding(σ)\neg\mathrm{isValidSignatureEncoding}(\sigma)¬isValidSignatureEncoding(σ); else false if sf.lowSsf.\mathrm{lowS}sf.lowS and not low-S DER; else false if sf.strictencsf.\mathrm{strictenc}sf.strictenc and the hash type is not defined; else true. With sf=sigFlagsOf(c.flags)sf=\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags})sf=sigFlagsOf(c.flags) this reduces to: true if σ=[ ]\sigma=[\,]σ=[]; false if c.flags.dersig=truec.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{dersig}=\mathrm{true}c.flags.dersig=true and ¬isValidSignatureEncoding(σ)\neg\mathrm{isValidSignatureEncoding}(\sigma)¬isValidSignatureEncoding(σ); true otherwise.
  • isValidSignatureEncoding(σ)\mathrm{isValidSignatureEncoding}(\sigma)isValidSignatureEncoding(σ), with ℓ=∣σ∣\ell=|\sigma|ℓ=∣σ∣ and out-of-range indices reading as 000: false if ℓ<9\ell<9ℓ<9 or ℓ>73\ell>73ℓ>73; requires σ[0]=0x30\sigma[0]=\mathtt{0x30}σ[0]=0x30, σ[1]=ℓ−3\sigma[1]=\ell-3σ[1]=ℓ−3; let ℓR=σ[3]\ell_R=\sigma[3]ℓR​=σ[3], require ℓ>5+ℓR\ell>5+\ell_Rℓ>5+ℓR​; let ℓS=σ[5+ℓR]\ell_S=\sigma[5+\ell_R]ℓS​=σ[5+ℓR​], require ℓR+ℓS+7=ℓ\ell_R+\ell_S+7=\ellℓR​+ℓS​+7=ℓ; σ[2]=0x02\sigma[2]=\mathtt{0x02}σ[2]=0x02; ℓR≠0\ell_R\ne0ℓR​=0; σ[4]<0x80\sigma[4]<\mathtt{0x80}σ[4]<0x80; not (ℓR>1\ell_R>1ℓR​>1 and σ[4]=0\sigma[4]=0σ[4]=0 and σ[5]<0x80\sigma[5]<\mathtt{0x80}σ[5]<0x80); σ[ℓR+4]=0x02\sigma[\ell_R+4]=\mathtt{0x02}σ[ℓR​+4]=0x02; ℓS≠0\ell_S\ne0ℓS​=0; σ[ℓR+6]<0x80\sigma[\ell_R+6]<\mathtt{0x80}σ[ℓR​+6]<0x80; not (ℓS>1\ell_S>1ℓS​>1 and σ[ℓR+6]=0\sigma[\ell_R+6]=0σ[ℓR​+6]=0 and σ[ℓR+7]<0x80\sigma[\ell_R+7]<\mathtt{0x80}σ[ℓR​+7]<0x80); true if all hold.
  • checkPubKeyEncoding(sf,v,π)\mathrm{checkPubKeyEncoding}(sf,v,\pi)checkPubKeyEncoding(sf,v,π): false if sf.strictencsf.\mathrm{strictenc}sf.strictenc and π\piπ is not a 33-byte (02/03\mathtt{02}/\mathtt{03}02/03) or 65-byte (04\mathtt{04}04) key; false if sf.witnessPubkeyTypesf.\mathrm{witnessPubkeyType}sf.witnessPubkeyType and v=witnessV0v=\mathrm{witnessV0}v=witnessV0 and π\piπ is not a 33-byte compressed key; else true. With sf=sigFlagsOf(c.flags)sf=\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags})sf=sigFlagsOf(c.flags) both flags are false, so this is always true: no public-key string is rejected at this stage.

Consequently, in this theorem, O.checkSig(σ,π)=noneO.\mathrm{checkSig}(\sigma,\pi)=\mathrm{none}O.checkSig(σ,π)=none iff c.flags.dersig=truec.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{dersig}=\mathrm{true}c.flags.dersig=true, σ≠[ ]\sigma\ne[\,]σ=[] and σ\sigmaσ fails isValidSignatureEncoding\mathrm{isValidSignatureEncoding}isValidSignatureEncoding; and O.checkSig(σ,π)=some trueO.\mathrm{checkSig}(\sigma,\pi)=\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{true}O.checkSig(σ,π)=sometrue iff that is not the case and checkECDSASignature(c.tx,c.nIn,c.amount,witnessV0,σ,π,B)=true\mathrm{checkECDSASignature}(c.\mathrm{tx},c.\mathrm{nIn},c.\mathrm{amount},\mathrm{witnessV0},\sigma,\pi,B)=\mathrm{true}checkECDSASignature(c.tx,c.nIn,c.amount,witnessV0,σ,π,B)=true.

checkECDSASignature(tx,nIn,amt,v,σ,π,sc)\mathrm{checkECDSASignature}(tx,nIn,amt,v,\sigma,\pi,sc)checkECDSASignature(tx,nIn,amt,v,σ,π,sc). False if ¬pubkeyValid(π)\neg\mathrm{pubkeyValid}(\pi)¬pubkeyValid(π), where pubkeyValid(π)\mathrm{pubkeyValid}(\pi)pubkeyValid(π) holds iff π≠[ ]\pi\ne[\,]π=[] and ∣π∣|\pi|∣π∣ equals 333333 when the first byte is 222 or 333, 656565 when it is 444, 666 or 777, and 000 otherwise (so any other first byte gives false). False if σ=[ ]\sigma=[\,]σ=[]. Otherwise let hththt be the last byte of σ\sigmaσ (as a natural number, the hash type) and σ′\sigma'σ′ be σ\sigmaσ without its last byte; let digest=sigHashWitnessV0(sc,tx,nIn,ht,amt)\mathit{digest}=\mathrm{sigHashWitnessV0}(sc,tx,nIn,ht,amt)digest=sigHashWitnessV0(sc,tx,nIn,ht,amt) (since v=witnessV0v=\mathrm{witnessV0}v=witnessV0); false if amt<0amt<0amt<0; otherwise pubkeyVerify(π,digest,σ′)\mathrm{pubkeyVerify}(\pi,\mathit{digest},\sigma')pubkeyVerify(π,digest,σ′).

sigHashWitnessV0(sc,tx,nIn,ht,amt)\mathrm{sigHashWitnessV0}(sc,tx,nIn,ht,amt)sigHashWitnessV0(sc,tx,nIn,ht,amt). Let acp:=(ht & 0x80≠0)\mathit{acp}:=(ht\,\&\,\mathtt{0x80}\ne0)acp:=(ht&0x80=0), single:=(ht & 0x1f=3)\mathit{single}:=(ht\,\&\,\mathtt{0x1f}=3)single:=(ht&0x1f=3), none:=(ht & 0x1f=2)\mathit{none}:=(ht\,\&\,\mathtt{0x1f}=2)none:=(ht&0x1f=2); 0\mathbf{0}0 the 32-byte zero string; ser32(x)\mathrm{ser32}(x)ser32(x) the 4 little-endian bytes of xxx modulo 2322^{32}232; serInt64(x)\mathrm{serInt64}(x)serInt64(x) the 8 little-endian bytes of x mod 264x \bmod 2^{64}xmod264; serBytes(b)\mathrm{serBytes}(b)serBytes(b) a CompactSize encoding of ∣b∣|b|∣b∣ followed by bbb; serOutPoint(h,n)=h ∥ ser32(n)\mathrm{serOutPoint}(h,n)=h\,\|\,\mathrm{ser32}(n)serOutPoint(h,n)=h∥ser32(n); serTxOut(o)=serInt64(o.nValue) ∥ serBytes(o.scriptPubKey)\mathrm{serTxOut}(o)=\mathrm{serInt64}(o.\mathrm{nValue})\,\|\,\mathrm{serBytes}(o.\mathrm{scriptPubKey})serTxOut(o)=serInt64(o.nValue)∥serBytes(o.scriptPubKey); Hash256=SHA256∘SHA256\mathrm{Hash256}=\mathrm{SHA256}\circ\mathrm{SHA256}Hash256=SHA256∘SHA256.

  • hashPrevouts:=Hash256\mathit{hashPrevouts}:=\mathrm{Hash256}hashPrevouts:=Hash256 of the concatenation over all inputs of serOutPoint(prevout)\mathrm{serOutPoint}(\mathrm{prevout})serOutPoint(prevout) if ¬acp\neg\mathit{acp}¬acp, else 0\mathbf{0}0;
  • hashSequence:=Hash256\mathit{hashSequence}:=\mathrm{Hash256}hashSequence:=Hash256 of the concatenation over all inputs of ser32(nSequence)\mathrm{ser32}(\mathrm{nSequence})ser32(nSequence) if ¬acp∧¬single∧¬none\neg\mathit{acp}\wedge\neg\mathit{single}\wedge\neg\mathit{none}¬acp∧¬single∧¬none, else 0\mathbf{0}0;
  • hashOutputs:=Hash256\mathit{hashOutputs}:=\mathrm{Hash256}hashOutputs:=Hash256 of the concatenation of serTxOut\mathrm{serTxOut}serTxOut over all outputs if ¬single∧¬none\neg\mathit{single}\wedge\neg\mathit{none}¬single∧¬none; else Hash256(serTxOut(vout[nIn]))\mathrm{Hash256}(\mathrm{serTxOut}(\mathrm{vout}[nIn]))Hash256(serTxOut(vout[nIn])) if single\mathit{single}single and nIn<∣vout∣nIn<|\mathrm{vout}|nIn<∣vout∣; else 0\mathbf{0}0;
  • i:=vin[nIn]i:=\mathrm{vin}[nIn]i:=vin[nIn], or the default input (prevout=([ ],0), scriptSig=[ ], nSequence=0, witness=[ ])(\mathrm{prevout}=([\,],0),\ \mathrm{scriptSig}=[\,],\ \mathrm{nSequence}=0,\ \mathrm{witness}=[\,])(prevout=([],0), scriptSig=[], nSequence=0, witness=[]) when nIn≥∣vin∣nIn\ge|\mathrm{vin}|nIn≥∣vin∣;
  • the digest is Hash256(ser32(version) ∥ hashPrevouts ∥ hashSequence ∥ serOutPoint(i.prevout) ∥ serBytes(sc) ∥ serInt64(amt) ∥ ser32(i.nSequence) ∥ hashOutputs ∥ ser32(nLockTime) ∥ ser32(ht))\mathrm{Hash256}\big(\mathrm{ser32}(\mathrm{version})\,\|\,\mathit{hashPrevouts}\,\|\,\mathit{hashSequence}\,\|\,\mathrm{serOutPoint}(i.\mathrm{prevout})\,\|\,\mathrm{serBytes}(sc)\,\|\,\mathrm{serInt64}(amt)\,\|\,\mathrm{ser32}(i.\mathrm{nSequence})\,\|\,\mathit{hashOutputs}\,\|\,\mathrm{ser32}(\mathrm{nLockTime})\,\|\,\mathrm{ser32}(ht)\big)Hash256(ser32(version)∥hashPrevouts∥hashSequence∥serOutPoint(i.prevout)∥serBytes(sc)∥serInt64(amt)∥ser32(i.nSequence)∥hashOutputs∥ser32(nLockTime)∥ser32(ht)).

pubkeyVerify(π,h,σ′)\mathrm{pubkeyVerify}(\pi,h,\sigma')pubkeyVerify(π,h,σ′). False if ¬pubkeyValid(π)\neg\mathrm{pubkeyValid}(\pi)¬pubkeyValid(π). Let Q:=parsePubkey(π)Q:=\mathrm{parsePubkey}(\pi)Q:=parsePubkey(π); false if none\mathrm{none}none. Let (r,s):=parseDerLax(σ′)(r,s):=\mathrm{parseDerLax}(\sigma')(r,s):=parseDerLax(σ′); false if none\mathrm{none}none. Otherwise ecdsaVerifyRaw(Q, beVal(h) mod n, r, normalizeS(s))\mathrm{ecdsaVerifyRaw}(Q,\ \mathrm{beVal}(h)\bmod n,\ r,\ \mathrm{normalizeS}(s))ecdsaVerifyRaw(Q, beVal(h)modn, r, normalizeS(s)), where beVal\mathrm{beVal}beVal is the big-endian value of a byte string and nnn is the secp256k1 group order.

  • parsePubkey(π)\mathrm{parsePubkey}(\pi)parsePubkey(π): for a 33-byte string with first byte 222 or 333, x:=x:=x:= big-endian value of the remaining 32 bytes; none\mathrm{none}none if x≥px\ge px≥p (the field prime 2256−232−9772^{256}-2^{32}-9772256−232−977); else, with y0:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4 mod py_0:=(x^3+7)^{(p+1)/4}\bmod py0​:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4modp, the point (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) with y∈{y0,p−y0}y\in\{y_0,p-y_0\}y∈{y0​,p−y0​} chosen so that yyy is odd iff the first byte is 333, provided y02≡x3+7(modp)y_0^2\equiv x^3+7\pmod py02​≡x3+7(modp), else none\mathrm{none}none. For a 65-byte string with first byte 444, 666 or 777: x,y:=x,y:=x,y:= big-endian values of bytes 111–323232 and 333333–646464; the point (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) iff x<px<px<p, y<py<py<p, y2≡x3+7(modp)y^2\equiv x^3+7\pmod py2≡x3+7(modp), and (if the first byte is 666 or 777) yyy is odd iff the byte is 777; else none\mathrm{none}none. Any other string: none\mathrm{none}none.
  • parseDerLax(σ′)\mathrm{parseDerLax}(\sigma')parseDerLax(σ′): a lax DER parse (sequence tag 0x30\mathtt{0x30}0x30, length byte possibly long-form, two integers each with tag 0x02\mathtt{0x02}0x02 and short- or long-form length with leading zero length bytes stripped and at most 3 length bytes); none\mathrm{none}none where the parser fails (empty input, wrong tags, lengths overrunning the input); after stripping leading zero bytes of each integer, the pair (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) if either integer has more than 32 significant bytes or if r≥nr\ge nr≥n or s≥ns\ge ns≥n; otherwise (r,s)(r,s)(r,s). Bytes after the second integer are ignored.
  • normalizeS(s)=n−s\mathrm{normalizeS}(s)=n-snormalizeS(s)=n−s if s>⌊n/2⌋s>\lfloor n/2\rfloors>⌊n/2⌋, else sss.
  • ecdsaVerifyRaw(Q,e,r,s)\mathrm{ecdsaVerifyRaw}(Q,e,r,s)ecdsaVerifyRaw(Q,e,r,s): false if r=0r=0r=0 or s=0s=0s=0 or r≥nr\ge nr≥n or s≥ns\ge ns≥n; else with w:=s n−2 mod nw:=s^{\,n-2}\bmod nw:=sn−2modn, u1:=e w mod nu_1:=e\,w\bmod nu1​:=ewmodn, u2:=r w mod nu_2:=r\,w\bmod nu2​:=rwmodn, and R:=u1G+u2QR:=u_1G+u_2QR:=u1​G+u2​Q computed by the file's affine secp256k1 formulas (double-and-add with 257 iterations of fuel, field inversion by Fermat exponentiation with 0↦00\mapsto00↦0), false if RRR is the point at infinity, and otherwise true iff x(R) mod n=rx(R)\bmod n=rx(R)modn=r. GGG is the standard secp256k1 generator given by its coordinates.

Left-hand side: verifyScript

verifyScript(tap,c,scriptSig,scriptPubKey,witness)\mathrm{verifyScript}(tap,c,\mathit{scriptSig},\mathit{scriptPubKey},\mathit{witness})verifyScript(tap,c,scriptSig,scriptPubKey,witness), in general:

  1. st1:=evalBytes(c,base,[ ],scriptSig)st_1:=\mathrm{evalBytes}(c,\mathrm{base},[\,],\mathit{scriptSig})st1​:=evalBytes(c,base,[],scriptSig); result false\mathrm{false}false if none\mathrm{none}none.
  2. st2:=evalBytes(c,base,st1,scriptPubKey)st_2:=\mathrm{evalBytes}(c,\mathrm{base},st_1,\mathit{scriptPubKey})st2​:=evalBytes(c,base,st1​,scriptPubKey); false\mathrm{false}false if none\mathrm{none}none.
  3. false\mathrm{false}false if ¬topTrue(st2)\neg\mathrm{topTrue}(st_2)¬topTrue(st2​), where topTrue\mathrm{topTrue}topTrue of an empty stack is false and otherwise is castToBool\mathrm{castToBool}castToBool of the top element.
  4. If c.flags.witnessc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{witness}c.flags.witness (true here by hfhfhf): compute isWitnessProgram(scriptPubKey)\mathrm{isWitnessProgram}(\mathit{scriptPubKey})isWitnessProgram(scriptPubKey); if it is some(v,prog)\mathrm{some}(v,\mathit{prog})some(v,prog) then the result is false\mathrm{false}false if scriptSig≠[ ]\mathit{scriptSig}\ne[\,]scriptSig=[], else verifyWitnessProgram(tap,c,witness,v,prog,false)\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}(tap,c,\mathit{witness},v,\mathit{prog},\mathrm{false})verifyWitnessProgram(tap,c,witness,v,prog,false); if it is none\mathrm{none}none, continue.
  5. (Only reached when the scriptPubKey is not a witness program.) If c.flags.p2shc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{p2sh}c.flags.p2sh and scriptPubKey\mathit{scriptPubKey}scriptPubKey is 23 bytes of the form 0xa9,0x14,…,0x87\mathtt{0xa9},\mathtt{0x14},\ldots,\mathtt{0x87}0xa9,0x14,…,0x87: the pay-to-script-hash branch (push-only scriptSig, redeem script taken from the top of st1st_1st1​, re-evaluation, a nested witness-program check); otherwise false\mathrm{false}false if c.flags.witnessc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{witness}c.flags.witness and witness≠[ ]\mathit{witness}\ne[\,]witness=[], else true\mathrm{true}true.

evalBytes(c,v,st,s)\mathrm{evalBytes}(c,v,st,s)evalBytes(c,v,st,s): none\mathrm{none}none if ∣s∣>10000|s|>10000∣s∣>10000; none\mathrm{none}none if parseScript(s)=none\mathrm{parseScript}(s)=\mathrm{none}parseScript(s)=none; otherwise evalScript(scriptFlagsOf(c.flags), legacyOracle(sigFlagsOf(c.flags),c.tx,c.nIn,c.amount,v,s), st, parsed(s))\mathrm{evalScript}\big(\mathrm{scriptFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags}),\ \mathrm{legacyOracle}(\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(c.\mathrm{flags}),c.\mathrm{tx},c.\mathrm{nIn},c.\mathrm{amount},v,s),\ st,\ \mathrm{parsed}(s)\big)evalScript(scriptFlagsOf(c.flags), legacyOracle(sigFlagsOf(c.flags),c.tx,c.nIn,c.amount,v,s), st, parsed(s)) — note the oracle's script code is the byte string sss being evaluated, and the signature version vvv is as passed.

parseScript(s)\mathrm{parseScript}(s)parseScript(s): splits sss into instructions left to right: a byte o≤0x4eo\le\mathtt{0x4e}o≤0x4e starts a push (size ooo if o<0x4co<\mathtt{0x4c}o<0x4c; the next 1, 2 or 4 little-endian bytes for 0x4c,0x4d,0x4e\mathtt{0x4c},\mathtt{0x4d},\mathtt{0x4e}0x4c,0x4d,0x4e), none\mathrm{none}none if the size or the data run past the end; a byte >0x4e>\mathtt{0x4e}>0x4e is a non-push opcode op(o)\mathrm{op}(o)op(o). The empty string parses to the empty script.

isWitnessProgram(s)\mathrm{isWitnessProgram}(s)isWitnessProgram(s): none\mathrm{none}none if ∣s∣<4|s|<4∣s∣<4 or ∣s∣>42|s|>42∣s∣>42; with b0:=s[0]b_0:=s[0]b0​:=s[0], none\mathrm{none}none if b0≠0b_0\ne0b0​=0 and (b0<0x51b_0<\mathtt{0x51}b0​<0x51 or b0>0x60b_0>\mathtt{0x60}b0​>0x60); some(decodeOpN(b0), s without its first two bytes)\mathrm{some}(\mathrm{decodeOpN}(b_0),\ s\text{ without its first two bytes})some(decodeOpN(b0​), s without its first two bytes) if s[1]+2=∣s∣s[1]+2=|s|s[1]+2=∣s∣, else none\mathrm{none}none; decodeOpN(0)=0\mathrm{decodeOpN}(0)=0decodeOpN(0)=0 and decodeOpN(b)=b−0x50\mathrm{decodeOpN}(b)=b-\mathtt{0x50}decodeOpN(b)=b−0x50 otherwise.

verifyWitnessProgram(tap,c,W,v,prog,isP2sh)\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}(tap,c,W,v,\mathit{prog},\mathit{isP2sh})verifyWitnessProgram(tap,c,W,v,prog,isP2sh), with WWW in witness order (last element on top):

  • v=0v=0v=0 and ∣prog∣=32|\mathit{prog}|=32∣prog∣=32: false\mathrm{false}false if W=[ ]W=[\,]W=[]; else let ς\varsigmaς be the last element of WWW; false\mathrm{false}false if SHA256(ς)≠prog\mathrm{SHA256}(\varsigma)\ne\mathit{prog}SHA256(ς)=prog; else executeWitnessScriptV0(c, reverse(W without its last element), ς)\mathrm{executeWitnessScriptV0}(c,\ \mathrm{reverse}(W\text{ without its last element}),\ \varsigma)executeWitnessScriptV0(c, reverse(W without its last element), ς).
  • v=0v=0v=0 and ∣prog∣=20|\mathit{prog}|=20∣prog∣=20: false\mathrm{false}false unless ∣W∣=2|W|=2∣W∣=2, then the pay-to-witness-public-key-hash execution. v=0v=0v=0 with any other program length: false\mathrm{false}false.
  • v=1v=1v=1, ∣prog∣=32|\mathit{prog}|=32∣prog∣=32, ¬isP2sh\neg\mathit{isP2sh}¬isP2sh: true\mathrm{true}true if ¬c.flags.taproot\neg c.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{taproot}¬c.flags.taproot, else tap(c,W,prog)tap(c,W,\mathit{prog})tap(c,W,prog) (the only place taptaptap is consulted).
  • otherwise true\mathrm{true}true (unknown versions and pay-to-anchor).

executeWitnessScriptV0(c,st,exec)\mathrm{executeWitnessScriptV0}(c,st,\mathit{exec})executeWitnessScriptV0(c,st,exec): false\mathrm{false}false if some element of ststst has length >520>520>520; else evalBytes(c,witnessV0,st,exec)\mathrm{evalBytes}(c,\mathrm{witnessV0},st,\mathit{exec})evalBytes(c,witnessV0,st,exec): false\mathrm{false}false if none\mathrm{none}none; if some(st′)\mathrm{some}(st')some(st′), the result is ∣st′∣=1|st'|=1∣st′∣=1 and topTrue(st′)\mathrm{topTrue}(st')topTrue(st′).

Specialized to the theorem's arguments (by the definitions above, on the concrete syntactic inputs): the scriptSig is [ ][\,][], which parses to the empty script and evaluates on the empty stack to some [ ]\mathrm{some}\,[\,]some[]; the scriptPubKey P=[0x00,0x20]∥HP=[\mathtt{0x00},\mathtt{0x20}]\|HP=[0x00,0x20]∥H parses to the two pushes push([ ]), push(H)\mathrm{push}([\,]),\ \mathrm{push}(H)push([]), push(H), evaluated under base\mathrm{base}base with the legacy oracle for script code PPP; isWitnessProgram(P)\mathrm{isWitnessProgram}(P)isWitnessProgram(P) is some(0,H)\mathrm{some}(0,H)some(0,H) (since ∣P∣=34∈[4,42]|P|=34\in[4,42]∣P∣=34∈[4,42], b0=0b_0=0b0​=0, and 0x20+2=34\mathtt{0x20}+2=340x20+2=34); the scriptSig is empty, so step 4 yields verifyWitnessProgram(tap,c, ws∥[B], 0, H, false)\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}(tap,c,\ ws\|[B],\ 0,\ H,\ \mathrm{false})verifyWitnessProgram(tap,c, ws∥[B], 0, H, false); there ∣H∣=32|H|=32∣H∣=32, the last element of ws∥[B]ws\|[B]ws∥[B] is BBB, and removing it and reversing gives reverse(ws)\mathrm{reverse}(ws)reverse(ws), so this is: false\mathrm{false}false if SHA256(B)≠H\mathrm{SHA256}(B)\ne HSHA256(B)=H (which is the definition of HHH), else executeWitnessScriptV0(c,reverse(ws),B)\mathrm{executeWitnessScriptV0}(c,\mathrm{reverse}(ws),B)executeWitnessScriptV0(c,reverse(ws),B), i.e. the 520520520-byte check on every element of wswsws, then evalBytes(c,witnessV0,reverse(ws),B)\mathrm{evalBytes}(c,\mathrm{witnessV0},\mathrm{reverse}(ws),B)evalBytes(c,witnessV0,reverse(ws),B) — which, if ∣B∣≤10000|B|\le10000∣B∣≤10000 and BBB parses, is the interpreter evalScript\mathrm{evalScript}evalScript with flags FFF and oracle OOO (the same FFF and OOO as on the right-hand side, since the script code is BBB and the version is witnessV0\mathrm{witnessV0}witnessV0) on the initial stack reverse(ws)\mathrm{reverse}(ws)reverse(ws) over the parsed BBB — and finally the requirement that the resulting stack have exactly one element whose castToBool\mathrm{castToBool}castToBool is true.

The interpreter evalScript (as invoked above)

evalScript(f,o,st0,S)\mathrm{evalScript}(f,o,st_0,S)evalScript(f,o,st0​,S) is none\mathrm{none}none or some(st)\mathrm{some}(st)some(st). State: (main stack, alternate stack, condition stack vfExec\mathit{vfExec}vfExec, opcode counter), initially (st0,[ ],[ ],0)(st_0,[\,],[\,],0)(st0​,[],[],0); instructions of SSS are run in order, any failure giving none\mathrm{none}none; after the last instruction the run fails if vfExec≠[ ]\mathit{vfExec}\ne[\,]vfExec=[], else returns the main stack.

  • push(x)\mathrm{push}(x)push(x): fail if ∣x∣>520|x|>520∣x∣>520; if all of vfExec\mathit{vfExec}vfExec is true (vacuous when empty) push xxx; fail if ∣main∣+∣alt∣>1000|\text{main}|+|\text{alt}|>1000∣main∣+∣alt∣>1000.
  • op(γ)\mathrm{op}(\gamma)op(γ): counted iff γ>0x60\gamma>\mathtt{0x60}γ>0x60; if counted and counter+1>201+1>201+1>201 fail, else increment if counted; fail if γ\gammaγ is one of the fifteen disabled opcodes; if all of vfExec\mathit{vfExec}vfExec is true or 0x63≤γ≤0x68\mathtt{0x63}\le\gamma\le\mathtt{0x68}0x63≤γ≤0x68, run the one-opcode executor (fail on failure) and then the 100010001000 check; else skip with the 100010001000 check.

One-opcode executor on the opcodes that the parsed BBB can contain, 0x52\mathtt{0x52}0x52 and 0xae\mathtt{0xae}0xae (the keys k1,k2k_1,k_2k1​,k2​ appear only as push data; if parsing of BBB yields other opcodes, their branches are not reproduced here):

  • γ=0x52\gamma=\mathtt{0x52}γ=0x52 (branch for 0x4f\mathtt{0x4f}0x4f or 0x51\mathtt{0x51}0x51–0x60\mathtt{0x60}0x60; not counted): push the script-number encoding of γ−0x50\gamma-\mathtt{0x50}γ−0x50, i.e. [0x02][\mathtt{0x02}][0x02].
  • γ=0xae\gamma=\mathtt{0xae}γ=0xae (counted), with main stack ststst and counter κ\kappaκ: fail if st=[ ]st=[\,]st=[]; st=nk::rst=n_k::rst=nk​::r; Nk:=N_k:=Nk​:= signed little-endian value of nkn_knk​ (fail if ∣nk∣>4|n_k|>4∣nk​∣>4; sign = top bit of last byte; empty =0=0=0); fail if Nk<0N_k<0Nk​<0 or Nk>20N_k>20Nk​>20; κ′:=κ+Nk\kappa':=\kappa+N_kκ′:=κ+Nk​, fail if κ′>201\kappa'>201κ′>201; keys:=\mathit{keys}:=keys:= first NkN_kNk​ of rrr, r:=r:=r:= rest, fail if fewer were available; fail if r=[ ]r=[\,]r=[]; r=ns::rr=n_s::rr=ns​::r; Ns:=N_s:=Ns​:= value of nsn_sns​ likewise (fail if ∣ns∣>4|n_s|>4∣ns​∣>4); fail if Ns<0N_s<0Ns​<0 or Ns>NkN_s>N_kNs​>Nk​; sigs:=\mathit{sigs}:=sigs:= first NsN_sNs​ of rrr, r:=r:=r:= rest, fail if fewer were available; multisigLoop(o,sigs,keys)\mathrm{multisigLoop}(o,\mathit{sigs},\mathit{keys})multisigLoop(o,sigs,keys): fail if none\mathrm{none}none, else okokok; fail if r=[ ]r=[\,]r=[]; r=d′::r′r=d'::r'r=d′::r′; fail if f.nulldummyf.\mathrm{nulldummy}f.nulldummy and d′≠[ ]d'\ne[\,]d′=[]; new main stack boolBytes(ok)::r′\mathrm{boolBytes}(ok)::r'boolBytes(ok)::r′ ([0x01][\mathtt{0x01}][0x01] for true, [ ][\,][] for false), counter κ′\kappa'κ′.

multisigLoop(o,sigs,keys)\mathrm{multisigLoop}(o,\mathit{sigs},\mathit{keys})multisigLoop(o,sigs,keys) (top-first): sigs=[ ]⇒some true\mathit{sigs}=[\,]\Rightarrow\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{true}sigs=[]⇒sometrue; sigs≠[ ],keys=[ ]⇒some false\mathit{sigs}\ne[\,],\mathit{keys}=[\,]\Rightarrow\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{false}sigs=[],keys=[]⇒somefalse; sigs=s::sigs′\mathit{sigs}=s::\mathit{sigs}'sigs=s::sigs′, keys=k::keys′\mathit{keys}=k::\mathit{keys}'keys=k::keys′: o.checkSig(s,k)o.\mathrm{checkSig}(s,k)o.checkSig(s,k) is none⇒none\mathrm{none}\Rightarrow\mathrm{none}none⇒none; some true⇒\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{true}\Rightarrowsometrue⇒ if ∣keys′∣<∣sigs′∣|\mathit{keys}'|<|\mathit{sigs}'|∣keys′∣<∣sigs′∣ then some false\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{false}somefalse else recurse on (sigs′,keys′)(\mathit{sigs}',\mathit{keys}')(sigs′,keys′); some false⇒\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{false}\Rightarrowsomefalse⇒ if ∣keys′∣<∣sigs∣|\mathit{keys}'|<|\mathit{sigs}|∣keys′∣<∣sigs∣ then some false\mathrm{some}\,\mathrm{false}somefalse else recurse on (sigs,keys′)(\mathit{sigs},\mathit{keys}')(sigs,keys′) (same signature, next key). The top signature is tried against the top key first.

What the quantification silently includes

  • wswsws may be empty or of any length; its elements may be of any size. On the right-hand side, a wswsws of length ≠3\ne3=3 makes FundingSpend\mathrm{FundingSpend}FundingSpend false; on the left, reverse(ws)\mathrm{reverse}(ws)reverse(ws) is the initial witness stack.
  • The hypotheses ∣k1∣,∣k2∣≤520|k_1|,|k_2|\le520∣k1​∣,∣k2​∣≤520 bound only the two keys; the keys are arbitrary byte strings (no public-key format is assumed; the encoding check on keys is vacuous under sigFlagsOf\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}sigFlagsOf, and format only enters through pubkeyValid\mathrm{pubkeyValid}pubkeyValid/parsePubkey\mathrm{parsePubkey}parsePubkey inside checkECDSASignature\mathrm{checkECDSASignature}checkECDSASignature).
  • c.amountc.\mathrm{amount}c.amount may be negative (then checkECDSASignature\mathrm{checkECDSASignature}checkECDSASignature is false for every signature/key pair); c.nInc.\mathrm{nIn}c.nIn may be out of range (then the default input is used in the digest); c.flags.p2sh,taproot,dersig,cltv,csv,nulldummyc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{p2sh},\mathrm{taproot},\mathrm{dersig},\mathrm{cltv},\mathrm{csv},\mathrm{nulldummy}c.flags.p2sh,taproot,dersig,cltv,csv,nulldummy are unconstrained; c.flags.witnessc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{witness}c.flags.witness is fixed to true by hfhfhf.
  • taptaptap is arbitrary and enters only through the version-1 branch of verifyWitnessProgram\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}verifyWitnessProgram.
  • The equivalence relates a boolean equal to true\mathrm{true}true on the left with a conjunction of a boolean equation, a universally quantified bound, and an existential proposition on the right.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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