Proof of Proposition 2, p. 34 — with benefit b the seller's optimal direct price is v − μ if f ≥ b + 2μ and v − (f − b)/2 if b ≤ f ≤ b + 2μ
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Benefits.best_responsebest-responseleakagep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformspricing
In the leakage game with transaction benefit (see the Setting), let , , and let the fee satisfy . Then a direct price is seller-optimal at if and only if
In particular the seller's optimal direct price exists and is unique. When the seller sets and there is no leakage; for the seller induces leakage, and above it diverts every buyer.
This is the first step of the proof of Proposition 2: it turns the marketplace's problem into an explicit optimization over .
Formalization Note The two printed cases agree at ; the Lean if takes the first.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Benefits_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
/-- Proof of Proposition 2, p. 34: with uniform switching costs on `[0, μ]`, for every fee
`f ≥ b` the seller's profit-maximizing direct price is unique and equals `v − μ` if
`f ≥ b + 2μ` and `v − (f − b)/2` if `b ≤ f ≤ b + 2μ`. -/
theorem best_response (v c μ b f pd : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hbf : b ≤ f) :
IsSOptB v c μ b f pd ↔ pd = (if b + 2 * μ ≤ f then v - μ else v - (f - b) / 2) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89c…98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), p. 34, §8.3, Proof of Proposition 2 (display for p*_d(f))
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.