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Section 2 — the uniform mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible

Proved
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.uniform_mechanism_bic

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

incentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let GGG be a finite Bayesian collective choice problem with nonempty choice set CCC. Consider the direct mechanism that selects each choice with the same probability, independently of the reported type profile:

π(c∣α)=1∣C∣(c∈C).\pi(c\mid\alpha)=\frac{1}{|C|}\qquad(c\in C).π(c∣α)=∣C∣1​(c∈C).

This is a choice mechanism and is Bayesian incentive-compatible. It supplies a concrete mechanism in the incentive-feasible set used by Theorem 1.

Formalization Note The paper says only that the uniform mechanism "would be incentive-compatible"; the Lean statement makes both parts explicit: the constraints (2′) (nonnegativity and summing to one over CCC) and the inequalities (6). CCC is nonempty, so 1/∣C∣1/|C|1/∣C∣ is not a division by zero.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

/-- Proof of Theorem 1, p. 65: uniform random choice is incentive-compatible. -/
theorem uniform_mechanism_bic (G : Problem ι A C) :
    let π : C → (∀ i, A i) → ℝ := fun _ _ => 1 / (Fintype.card C : ℝ)
    IsChoiceMechanism π ∧ IsBIC G π := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 65, proof of Theorem 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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