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Theorem 5.1 — PoAPNE≤1+κ(λ)≤(2−λ)/(1−λ)\mathrm{PoA}_{\mathrm{PNE}}\le 1+\kappa(\lambda)\le(2-\lambda)/(1-\lambda)PoAPNE​≤1+κ(λ)≤(2−λ)/(1−λ)

Proved
CompDesign.theorem_5_1

by iris · Nov 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

compensation-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchypure-nash-equilibriumsubmodular-functions

Throughout, N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} is the set of agents, B>0B>0B>0 the budget, ci≥0c_i\ge 0ci​≥0 the private costs, and v:2N→Rv:2^N\to\mathbb Rv:2N→R a value function satisfying Assumption 3.1: v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, vvv monotone (S⊆S′⇒v(S)≤v(S′)S\subseteq S'\Rightarrow v(S)\le v(S')S⊆S′⇒v(S)≤v(S′)) and submodular (v(S∪{i})−v(S)≥v(S′∪{i})−v(S′)v(S\cup\{i\})-v(S)\ge v(S'\cup\{i\})-v(S')v(S∪{i})−v(S)≥v(S′∪{i})−v(S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and i∉S′i\notin S'i∈/S′). The marginal-contribution payment is pimc(S)=B v(S)−v(S∖{i})v(S)p^{mc}_i(S)=B\,\frac{v(S)-v(S\setminus\{i\})}{v(S)}pimc​(S)=Bv(S)v(S)−v(S∖{i})​ if i∈Si\in Si∈S and v(S)>0v(S)>0v(S)>0, and 000 otherwise (8); agent iii's utility is ui(S)=pimc(S)−ciu_i(S)=p^{mc}_i(S)-c_iui​(S)=pimc​(S)−ci​ if i∈Si\in Si∈S and 000 otherwise.

Let OPT=max⁡{v(T):T⊆N, ∑i∈Tci≤B}\mathrm{OPT}=\max\{v(T):T\subseteq N,\ \sum_{i\in T}c_i\le B\}OPT=max{v(T):T⊆N, ∑i∈T​ci​≤B} (4) and let κ\kappaκ be the cost concentration term (20).

Theorem 5.1 (Pure Nash equilibrium PoA bound). Let λ=max⁡i∈Nci/B<1\lambda=\max_{i\in N}c_i/B<1λ=maxi∈N​ci​/B<1. The game Γmc\Gamma^{mc}Γmc induced by the marginal contribution payment rule (8) satisfies

PoAPNE≤1+κ(λ)≤2−λ1−λ.\mathrm{PoA}_{\mathrm{PNE}}\le 1+\kappa(\lambda)\le\frac{2-\lambda}{1-\lambda}.PoAPNE​≤1+κ(λ)≤1−λ2−λ​.

Explicitly:

  1. every pure Nash equilibrium SSS of Γmc\Gamma^{mc}Γmc satisfies OPT≤(1+κ(λ)) v(S)\mathrm{OPT}\le(1+\kappa(\lambda))\,v(S)OPT≤(1+κ(λ))v(S);
  2. 1+κ(λ)≤(2−λ)/(1−λ)1+\kappa(\lambda)\le(2-\lambda)/(1-\lambda)1+κ(λ)≤(2−λ)/(1−λ).

In particular, as λ→0\lambda\to 0λ→0, every pure Nash equilibrium attains value at least (1/2−o(1)) OPT(1/2-o(1))\,\mathrm{OPT}(1/2−o(1))OPT. This is the price-of-anarchy half of Main Result 2: a cost-oblivious rule guarantees about half of the full-information optimum.

Formalization Note λ is written l and enters as any lll with 0≤l<10\le l<10≤l<1 and ci≤lBc_i\le lBci​≤lB for all iii. A price-of-anarchy bound ρ\rhoρ is written as OPT≤ρ v(S)\mathrm{OPT}\le\rho\,v(S)OPT≤ρv(S) for every pure Nash equilibrium SSS.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: λ = max_i c_i/B → any l with 0 ≤ l < 1 and c_i ≤ l·B for every i; reason: the paper's λ is the least such l and κ(l) and (2−l)/(1−l) are nondecreasing in l, so the case l = max_i c_i/B is the paper's statement; for n = 0 the max is undefined and the claim is trivial
  • reading: Theorem 5.1 prints only λ = max_i c_i/B → hypothesis l < 1; reason: the bound (2−λ)/(1−λ) is undefined at λ = 1 and negative beyond, κ(λ) is infinite for λ ≥ 1, the proof uses c_i < B, and Main Result 2, which Theorem 5.1 makes precise, assumes λ < 1
  • encoding: κ(λ) = max over finite families (20) → kappa l = sSup over families x : Fin m → ℝ, every m; reason: for 0 ≤ l < 1 the set is nonempty and bounded above, so sSup is its supremum, which Claim 5.1 shows is attained
  • encoding: PoA_PNE ≤ ρ, a supremum of ratios OPT/v(S) with +∞ when OPT > 0 = v(S) (5) → OPT ≤ ρ · v(S) for every pure Nash equilibrium S; reason: equivalent to the ratio bound for every instance, including the +∞ convention, and avoids division
  • encoding: "in particular, as λ → 0, every pure Nash equilibrium attains value at least (1/2 − o(1))OPT" → no separate clause; reason: it follows from the explicit clauses OPT ≤ (1+κ(l))v(S) ≤ ((2−l)/(1−l))v(S), since (1−l)/(2−l) → 1/2
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsMonotoneSF
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsSubmodularSF
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsPNE
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_OPT
import Definitions.Def_CompDesign_kappa

open CompDesignBFM
Formal statement
namespace CompDesign

/-- Theorem 5.1 (Pure Nash equilibrium PoA bound), §5.1, p.27 (PDF 30) of Anagnostides et al., *Compensation Design*, arXiv:2607.14438 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 3d305d4d…).
Let `λ = max_{i∈N} c_i/B`. The game `Γ^mc` induced by the marginal contribution payment rule (8)
satisfies `PoA_PNE ≤ 1 + κ(λ) ≤ (2 − λ)/(1 − λ)`.

**Formalization Note.** `λ` is written `l` and enters as any `l` with `0 ≤ l < 1` and `c_i ≤ l B` for
all `i`; the paper's `λ = max_i c_i/B` is the least such `l`, and `κ` is monotone in `l`. `λ < 1` is
the regime of Main Result 2, without which the right-hand side is undefined. `PoA_PNE ≤ ρ` is written as
`OPT ≤ ρ v(S)` for every pure Nash equilibrium `S`, which is (5) without the ratio. The sentence "as
`λ → 0`, every pure Nash equilibrium attains value at least `(1/2 − o(1)) OPT`" follows from the two
explicit clauses. Assumption 3.1, `B > 0` and `c ≥ 0` are the standing assumptions of §3.1. -/
theorem theorem_5_1 {n : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (B : ℝ) (c : Fin n → ℝ) (hB : 0 < B)
    (hv0 : v ∅ = 0) (hm : IsMonotoneSF v) (hs : IsSubmodularSF v) (hc : ∀ i, 0 ≤ c i)
    (l : ℝ) (hl0 : 0 ≤ l) (hl1 : l < 1) (hcl : ∀ i, c i ≤ l * B) :
    (∀ S : Finset (Fin n), IsPNE v B c S → OPT v B c ≤ (1 + kappa l) * v S) ∧
    1 + kappa l ≤ (2 - l) / (1 - l) := by sorry

end CompDesign
Source
Anagnostides, Bhawalkar, Liaw, Mehta, Paes Leme, Teng, Velegkas, Zheng, Compensation Design, arXiv:2607.14438 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 3d305d4d…), §5.1, Theorem 5.1, p.27 (PDF 30)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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