Section 4 — dummy firms earn zero profit in the fictitious market strict core
ProvedKelsoCrawford.OneSided.dummy_firms_zero_profitcoalition-gamematchingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1strict-core
Let be a coalition production function on a finite worker set, with nonnegative marginal production (MP′) and (NFL). Let every worker's salary utility be strictly increasing and continuous. In the fictitious market with identical firms and workers, every firm earns zero profit at any strict-core allocation :
Here is the set assigned to firm and is the salary of worker . This fact connects two-sided firm feasibility to the one-sided aggregate budget.
Formalization Note All salaries are real and all workers are assigned; empty firms have profit . MP′ and utility regularity are standing assumptions in the paper's fictitious-market argument.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_OneSided_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_OneSided_Fictitious
Formal statement
namespace KelsoCrawford.OneSided
theorem dummy_firms_zero_profit {W : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W]
(v : Finset W → ℝ) (μ : W → ℝ → ℝ)
(hMP : ∀ i (C : Finset W), 0 ≤ v (insert i C) - v C)
(hNFL : v ∅ = 0)
(hμ : ∀ i, StrictMono (μ i) ∧ Continuous (μ i))
(A : Allocation W (Fin (Fintype.card W + 1)))
(hcore : (fictitious v μ).IsStrictCore KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore.anySalary A) :
∀ j, profit v (A.hired j) A.sal = 0 := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.OneSided
Source
Kelso and Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 1493, Section 4, proof of Theorem 3, sentence beginning “note that dummy firms’ profits”
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.