Sec. 5.4, p. 19 — with a rebate on kept units only, the retailer's optimal refund is r* = s − u < s
ProvedSuReturns.Coordination.sec54_kept_only_rebate_refundSuppose the manufacturer pays the sales rebate only for units that are sold and kept by the consumer. The retailer's profit is then
with the expected sales under the demand rule (6), valuations of finite mean and nonnegative demand. For every stock , the refund with the price is optimal for the retailer, and it lies below the supply chain optimal refund :
So a rebate that excludes returned units distorts the refund downward, which is why the coordinating rebate of Proposition 5 must be paid on all sold units.
Formalization Note The paper gives this contract in prose only; the profit is (24) with the rebate removed from the returned-units term. Only optimality of (with the matching price) at each fixed is stated, not uniqueness.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SuReturns_Coordination_Model open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
namespace SuReturns.Coordination
theorem sec54_kept_only_rebate_refund (ν D : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
[IsProbabilityMeasure D] (hν : Integrable (fun v => v) ν) (hD0 : D (Set.Iio 0) = 0)
(s w u : ℝ) (hu : 0 < u) :
(∀ p r q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q →
retailerKeptRebate ν D s w u p q r ≤
retailerKeptRebate ν D s w u (SuReturns.PartialRefunds.reservationPrice ν (s - u)) q (s - u)) ∧
s - u < s := by sorry
end SuReturns.Coordination
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.