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Proposition 2, p. 14 — a truth-revealing equilibrium exists iff Σ µ(m|H)a_m ≤ [1 + η(1/θ_H + 1/θ_L − 1)]w ≤ Σ µ(m|L)a_m

Proved
YieldCheapTalk.Truthful.proposition_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 22, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cheap-talkp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1random-yieldtruth-revealing-equilibrium

Consider Lu's cheap-talk game: a supplier of privately known yield type t∈{H,L}t \in \{H, L\}t∈{H,L} (mean yields θH>θL\theta_H > \theta_LθH​>θL​, common coefficient of variation δ\deltaδ) sends a costless, unverifiable report of her type to a buyer who privately knows the market state m∈{H,L}m \in \{H, L\}m∈{H,L} (market potentials aH>aLa_H > a_LaH​>aL​, inverse demand am−bxa_m - bxam​−bx), and the buyer then orders under the contract (w,η)(w, \eta)(w,η). Let μ(m∣t)\mu(m\mid t)μ(m∣t) be the probability of state mmm given type ttt. Under the standing assumptions of the model, a truth-revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists — that is, there are an ordering strategy Q∗Q^*Q∗ and beliefs β\betaβ forming a PBE with the truthful messaging strategy r(t)=tr(t) = tr(t)=t — if and only if

∑m∈Mμ(m∣H) am  ≤  [1+η(1θH+1θL−1)]w  ≤  ∑m∈Mμ(m∣L) am.(6)\sum_{m\in M}\mu(m\mid H)\,a_m \;\le\; \Big[1 + \eta\Big(\frac{1}{\theta_H} + \frac{1}{\theta_L} - 1\Big)\Big] w \;\le\; \sum_{m\in M}\mu(m\mid L)\,a_m . \tag{6}m∈M∑​μ(m∣H)am​≤[1+η(θH​1​+θL​1​−1)]w≤m∈M∑​μ(m∣L)am​.(6)

This is the paper's main existence result: the supplier's yield risk can be credibly communicated by cheap talk exactly when the expected market potential conditional on each type brackets the adjusted wholesale rate. In particular (6) requires the low type to expect a higher market potential than the high type.

Formalization Note. The standing assumptions are those of §3 together with aH>aLa_H > a_LaH​>aL​, which the paper assumes from p. 12 on; the equivalence itself does not use aH>aLa_H > a_LaH​>aL​. b>0b > 0b>0 and w>0w > 0w>0 are added; with w>0w > 0w>0 the model forces θL>0\theta_L > 0θL​>0, so 1/θH1/\theta_H1/θH​ and 1/θL1/\theta_L1/θL​ are genuine reciprocals. The equilibrium is the paper's PBE (pp. 8–9) with optimality of the order over all Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 and beliefs that are probability distributions; the statement is not the equivalence of (5) and (6), which is a step of its proof.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_YieldCheapTalk_Truthful_Setting
open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace YieldCheapTalk.Truthful
theorem proposition_2 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) :
    (∃ (Q : Level → Level → ℝ) (beta : Level → Level → Level → ℝ), M.IsPBE id Q beta) ↔
      (∑ m, M.mu m .H * M.a m ≤ (1 + M.eta * (1 / M.theta .H + 1 / M.theta .L - 1)) * M.w ∧
        (1 + M.eta * (1 / M.theta .H + 1 / M.theta .L - 1)) * M.w ≤
          ∑ m, M.mu m .L * M.a m) := by sorry
end YieldCheapTalk.Truthful
Source
Lu, Can a Supplier’s Yield Risk Be Truthfully Communicated via Cheap Talk?, author manuscript of 14 July 2024 (MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0089), p. 14, Proposition 2, (6)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 23, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 23, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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