Corollary 1: quantum monopoly without product differentiation
ProvedQuantumEcon.Duopoly.corollary_1cournoteconomicsgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1quantum-economic-advantage
With no investment, identical offerings (), and , the unique constrained Cournot equilibrium has classical quantity zero and quantum quantity . The classical unit cost exceeds demand while the quantum firm can still sell.
This statement is a source-indexed target for the two-stage model.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QuantumEcon_Duopoly_Setting set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace QuantumEcon.Duopoly
/-- Bova, Goldfarb, Melko, Quantum Economic Advantage, NBER Working Paper No. 29724
(February 2022), PDF p. 17, Corollary 1, in the no-investment §3.1 model.
Formalization Note: `γ = 1`, and `a < c²` replaces the main model's standing
`c² < a`; `a > c` makes the quantum monopolist's output positive. -/
theorem corollary_1 (a c q₁ q₂ : ℝ) (hc : 1 < c) (hca : c < a) (hac : a < c ^ 2) :
SupplierAudit.Competition.IsCournotNash 1 a c a (c ^ 2) q₁ q₂ ↔
q₁ = (a - c) / 2 ∧ q₂ = 0 := by sorry
end QuantumEcon.Duopoly
Source
Bova, Goldfarb, Melko, Quantum Economic Advantage, NBER Working Paper No. 29724 (February 2022), PDF p. 17, Corollary 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.