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Theorem 1, p. 996 — for κ ∈ (0, π) and small ε the target rebate (w*, û(w*), T*) exists uniquely, coordinates the channel and gives r* = κ, m* = π − κ

Proved
ChannelRebate.Quantity.theorem1_target_rebate_coordination

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

channel-coordinationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain-contractstarget-rebate

Let demand ξ\xiξ have a density φ\varphiφ that vanishes on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0) and is positive on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Assumption A4), with finite mean, distribution Φ\PhiΦ and Γ(Q)=∫0Qξ dΦ(ξ)\Gamma(Q) = \int_0^Q \xi\,d\Phi(\xi)Γ(Q)=∫0Q​ξdΦ(ξ). Let 0<c<p0 < c < p0<c<p and s<cs < cs<c, let Qˉ0>0\bar Q_0 > 0Qˉ​0​>0 satisfy Φ(Qˉ0)=(p−c)/(p−s)\Phi(\bar Q_0) = (p-c)/(p-s)Φ(Qˉ​0​)=(p−c)/(p−s), and let π=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ0)\pi = (p-s)\Gamma(\bar Q_0)π=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ​0​) be the integrated-channel profit. Write u^(w)=(w−c)(p−s)/(c−s)\hat u(w) = (w-c)(p-s)/(c-s)u^(w)=(w−c)(p−s)/(c−s) and, for a wholesale price www, let r‾(w)=−wQ0+pEmin⁡(Q0,ξ)+sE(Q0−ξ)+\underline r(w) = -wQ_0 + pE\min(Q_0,\xi) + sE(Q_0-\xi)^+r​(w)=−wQ0​+pEmin(Q0​,ξ)+sE(Q0​−ξ)+ be the retailer's profit under the wholesale price-only contract at the order Q0≥0Q_0 \ge 0Q0​≥0 with Φ(Q0)=(p−w)/(p−s)\Phi(Q_0) = (p-w)/(p-s)Φ(Q0​)=(p−w)/(p−s).

Fix κ∈(0,π)\kappa \in (0,\pi)κ∈(0,π). Then there is ε0>0\varepsilon_0 > 0ε0​>0 such that for every ε∈(0,κ)\varepsilon \in (0,\kappa)ε∈(0,κ) with ε<ε0\varepsilon < \varepsilon_0ε<ε0​ there is exactly one triple (w∗,u∗,T∗)(w^*,u^*,T^*)(w∗,u∗,T∗) of reals satisfying the contract specification

  1. r‾(w∗)=κ−ε\underline r(w^*) = \kappa - \varepsilonr​(w∗)=κ−ε;
  2. u∗=u^(w∗)u^* = \hat u(w^*)u∗=u^(w∗);
  3. T∗≥0T^* \ge 0T∗≥0 and
(p+u∗−s)Γ(Qˉ0)−u∗(Γ(T∗)+T∗[1−Φ(T∗)])=κ,(1)(p+u^*-s)\Gamma(\bar Q_0) - u^*\big(\Gamma(T^*) + T^*[1-\Phi(T^*)]\big) = \kappa, \qquad (1)(p+u∗−s)Γ(Qˉ​0​)−u∗(Γ(T∗)+T∗[1−Φ(T∗)])=κ,(1)

and this triple satisfies

  • (a) w∗∈(c,p)w^* \in (c,p)w∗∈(c,p), u∗>0u^* > 0u∗>0, T∗>0T^* > 0T∗>0;
  • (b) channel coordination: Qˉ0\bar Q_0Qˉ​0​ is the retailer's unique optimal order under (w∗,u∗,T∗)(w^*,u^*,T^*)(w∗,u∗,T∗), arg⁡max⁡Q≥0r(Q∣T∗)={Qˉ0}\arg\max_{Q\ge 0} r(Q\mid T^*) = \{\bar Q_0\}argmaxQ≥0​r(Q∣T∗)={Qˉ​0​};
  • (c) the retailer earns r∗=r(Qˉ0∣T∗)=κr^* = r(\bar Q_0\mid T^*) = \kappar∗=r(Qˉ​0​∣T∗)=κ and the manufacturer earns m∗=(w∗−c)Qˉ0−u∗E(min⁡(Qˉ0,ξ)−T∗)+=π−κm^* = (w^*-c)\bar Q_0 - u^*E(\min(\bar Q_0,\xi)-T^*)^+ = \pi - \kappam∗=(w∗−c)Qˉ​0​−u∗E(min(Qˉ​0​,ξ)−T∗)+=π−κ.

The theorem shows that a target rebate, with no side payment, coordinates the newsvendor channel and splits its profit in any proportion.

Formalization Note "For ε\varepsilonε sufficiently small" is the existence of the threshold ε0\varepsilon_0ε0​. Uniqueness ranges over all real triples satisfying 1–3, with www unrestricted; that w∗∈(c,p)w^* \in (c,p)w∗∈(c,p) is part of the conclusion. Coordination is stated as equality of the set of maximizers over Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 with {Qˉ0}\{\bar Q_0\}{Qˉ​0​}, i.e. global optimality, not a first-order condition.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting
open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity

/-- Taylor (2002), Theorem 1 and display (1), p. 996. For `κ ∈ (0, π)`, `π = (p − s)Γ(Q̄₀)`,
and every sufficiently small `ε ∈ (0, κ)`, there is exactly one triple `(w*, u*, T*)` with
(1) `r̲(w*) = κ − ε`, (2) `u* = û(w*)`, (3) `T* ≥ 0` solving (1); and it satisfies
(a) `w* ∈ (c, p)`, `u* > 0`, `T* > 0`; (b) the retailer's unique optimal order is `Q̄₀`
(channel coordination); (c) `r* = κ` and `m* = π − κ`. -/
theorem theorem1_target_rebate_coordination (p c s : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcp : c < p)
    (hsc : s < c) (D : Demand)
    (Qbar0 : ℝ) (hQbar0 : 0 < Qbar0) (hΦbar : Phi D Qbar0 = (p - c) / (p - s))
    (κ : ℝ) (hκ0 : 0 < κ) (hκπ : κ < (p - s) * Gam D Qbar0) :
    ∃ ε0 : ℝ, 0 < ε0 ∧ ∀ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε → ε < ε0 → ε < κ →
      ∃! x : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ,
        -- the contract specification (1)–(3), with x = (w, u, T)
        ((∃ Q0 : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q0 ∧ Phi D Q0 = (p - x.1) / (p - s) ∧
            wholesaleProfit p s x.1 D Q0 = κ - ε) ∧
          x.2.1 = uHat p c s x.1 ∧
          0 ≤ x.2.2 ∧
          (p + x.2.1 - s) * Gam D Qbar0
            - x.2.1 * (Gam D x.2.2 + x.2.2 * (1 - Phi D x.2.2)) = κ) ∧
        -- (a)
        (c < x.1 ∧ x.1 < p ∧ 0 < x.2.1 ∧ 0 < x.2.2) ∧
        -- (b) channel coordination
        optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s x.1 x.2.1 x.2.2 D) = {Qbar0} ∧
        -- (c)
        retailerProfit p s x.1 x.2.1 x.2.2 D Qbar0 = κ ∧
        manufProfit c x.1 x.2.1 x.2.2 D Qbar0 = (p - s) * Gam D Qbar0 - κ := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 996, Theorem 1 and display (1); proof p. 1005
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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