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Theorem 2, p. 11 — for H > M/ϵ the (ϵ,H)-smoothed pacing game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Proved
MultPacing.Existence.theorem_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

equilibrium-existencenash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pacingsmoothed-game

Consider a pacing game with valuations vij≥0v_{ij}\ge0vij​≥0 and budgets Bi>0B_i>0Bi​>0, a smoothing parameter ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 and the (ϵ,H)(\epsilon,H)(ϵ,H)-smoothed pacing game, in which a strategy of buyer iii is a multiplier αi∈[0,1]\alpha_i\in[0,1]αi​∈[0,1]. Let MMM be an upper bound on the sum of every buyer's valuations including the artificial good, that is

∑jvij+2ϵ≤Mfor every buyer i.\sum_j v_{ij}+2\epsilon\le M\quad\text{for every buyer } i .j∑​vij​+2ϵ≤Mfor every buyer i.

If H>M/ϵH>M/\epsilonH>M/ϵ, the smoothed game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: a profile α∈[0,1]N\alpha\in[0,1]^Nα∈[0,1]N such that ui(a,α−i)≤ui(α)u_i(a,\alpha_{-i})\le u_i(\alpha)ui​(a,α−i​)≤ui​(α) for every buyer iii and every a∈[0,1]a\in[0,1]a∈[0,1].

The equilibria of the smoothed games are the approximations whose limit, as ϵ→0\epsilon\to0ϵ→0 and H→∞H\to\inftyH→∞, gives the pacing equilibrium of Theorem 1.

Formalization Note The artificial good gives buyer iii the value 2αiϵ≤2ϵ2\alpha_i\epsilon\le2\epsilon2αi​ϵ≤2ϵ, which is why the bound reads ∑jvij+2ϵ≤M\sum_j v_{ij}+2\epsilon\le M∑j​vij​+2ϵ≤M. Definition 3 assumes H>0H>0H>0; this follows from H>M/ϵH>M/\epsilonH>M/ϵ whenever there is a buyer (then M≥2ϵ>0M\ge2\epsilon>0M≥2ϵ>0), and with no buyer the conclusion holds trivially, so it is not a separate hypothesis.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: "M any upper bound on the sum of a buyer's valuations, including those for the artificial good" → ∀ i, ∑ j, v i j + 2ε ≤ M; reason: the artificial good is worth 2ϵ2\epsilon2ϵ per unit and a buyer receives at most one unit.
  • encoding: Definition 3's standing H>0H>0H>0 → not a hypothesis; reason: implied by H>M/ϵH>M/\epsilonH>M/ϵ when there is a buyer, and the conclusion is trivial when there is none.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultPacing_Existence_Smoothed
Formal statement
namespace MultPacing.Existence

theorem theorem_2 {N G : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype G] (P : PacingGame N G)
    (ε H M : ℝ) (hε : 0 < ε) (hM : ∀ i, ∑ j, P.v i j + 2 * ε ≤ M) (hH : M / ε < H) :
    ∃ α : N → ℝ, IsSmoothedPNE P ε H α := by sorry

end MultPacing.Existence
Source
Conitzer, Kroer, Sodomka & Stier-Moses, Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets, arXiv:1706.07151v5, p. 11 (PDF 11), Theorem 2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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