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Statistical distance, TDHF security, IND-CPA security and the Section A.1 encryption scheme

Definition
TrapdoorHCF_CCA2_Supplement_CPA

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cryptographyp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptiontrapdoor-hardcore-functions

This file fixes four notions used by the chosen-plaintext half of the source.

  1. Statistical distance. For probability mass functions p,qp,qp,q on an arbitrary set Ω\OmegaΩ,
Δ(p,q)=12∑ω∈Ω∣p(ω)−q(ω)∣.\Delta(p,q)=\tfrac12\sum_{\omega\in\Omega}\bigl|p(\omega)-q(\omega)\bigr|.Δ(p,q)=21​ω∈Ω∑​​p(ω)−q(ω)​.

The sum is taken over every outcome; no finiteness of Ω\OmegaΩ is assumed.

  1. TDHF security (Definition 10). For a trapdoor hardcore function TTT with hardcore length l(λ)l(\lambda)l(λ), sample (pk,sk)←KGen(1λ)(pk,sk)\leftarrow\mathrm{KGen}(1^\lambda)(pk,sk)←KGen(1λ) and x←Dλx\leftarrow D_\lambdax←Dλ​. A uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary receives (1λ,pk,Eval(pk,x),z)(1^\lambda,pk,\mathrm{Eval}(pk,x),z)(1λ,pk,Eval(pk,x),z), where z=hEval(pk,x)z=\mathrm{hEval}(pk,x)z=hEval(pk,x) in the real experiment and zzz is a uniform string of l(λ)l(\lambda)l(λ) bits in the random one. Its advantage is the absolute difference of its output-one probabilities. TTT is secure if it is perfectly correct and every such adversary has negligible advantage.

  2. IND-CPA security (Definition 2 with atk = CPA). The classical two-stage game with no decryption access: the first stage sees (1λ,pk)(1^\lambda,pk)(1λ,pk) and names m0,m1∈{0,1}n(λ)m_0,m_1\in\{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)}m0​,m1​∈{0,1}n(λ); invalid messages make the experiment output 000; the second stage receives Enc(pk,mb)\mathrm{Enc}(pk,m_b)Enc(pk,mb​) and its state. The scheme is IND-CPA secure if every uniform PPT adversary has negligible advantage. No correctness is part of this notion.

  3. The Section A.1 scheme KEM(T)\mathrm{KEM}(T)KEM(T). Keys are those of TTT. To encrypt mmm, sample an input r←Dλr\leftarrow D_\lambdar←Dλ​ and output (Eval(pk,r), hEval(pk,r)⊕m)(\mathrm{Eval}(pk,r),\ \mathrm{hEval}(pk,r)\oplus m)(Eval(pk,r), hEval(pk,r)⊕m). To decrypt (ct1,ct2)(ct_1,ct_2)(ct1​,ct2​), compute z=pInv(sk,ct1)z=\mathrm{pInv}(sk,ct_1)z=pInv(sk,ct1​); output ⊥\perp⊥ if z=⊥z=\perpz=⊥, and otherwise z⊕ct2z\oplus ct_2z⊕ct2​.

These are the objects of Theorems 1, 5 and 6 and the base of the lossy constructions.

Formalization Note The adversary model, the stage runner runStage and the advantage are the published base definitions; the IND-CPA game is the base IND-CCA2 game with both oracles removed. Ciphertext pairs are tuple codes. Decryption of KEM(T)\mathrm{KEM}(T)KEM(T) also returns ⊥\perp⊥ when ∣z∣≠∣ct2∣|z|\ne|ct_2|∣z∣=∣ct2​∣, which happens only for strings outside the ciphertext space and makes decryption output elements of {0,1}l(λ)∪{⊥}\{0,1\}^{l(\lambda)}\cup\{\perp\}{0,1}l(λ)∪{⊥}.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TrapdoorHCF_CCA2_Constructions
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false

namespace TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement

open TrapdoorHCF.CCA2

/-- Notation 8, p.10: statistical distance `Δ(X,Y) = ½ Σ_ω |Pr[X=ω] − Pr[Y=ω]|`, over every
outcome `ω` of an arbitrary (possibly infinite) type. On PMFs the series is summable. -/
noncomputable def sd {α : Type} (p q : PMF α) : ℝ :=
  (1 / 2) * ∑' ω, |(p ω).toReal - (q ω).toReal|

/-- Definition 10, p.16. One oracle-free stage on input `(1^λ, pk, Eval(pk,x), z)`, with
`x ← D_λ` and `z` the designated value (`b = false`) or `l(λ)` uniform bits (`b = true`).
The first bit of the output is the guess; exhaustion outputs 0. -/
noncomputable def expTDHF (l : ℕ → ℕ) (T : TDHF) (A : RestrictedDec.Adversary) (b : Bool)
    (lam : ℕ) : PMF Bool := do
  let keys ← T.keyLaw lam
  let x ← T.inputLaw lam
  let u ← coinsLaw (l lam)
  let y := T.eval lam keys.1 x
  let z := if b then List.ofFn u else T.hEval lam keys.1 x
  let r ← runStage A lam (fun _ => none) (A.p.eval lam + 1) []
    (BeyondDS.tup [encNat lam, keys.1, y, z])
  pure ((r.output.getD []).headD false)

noncomputable def advTDHF (l : ℕ → ℕ) (T : TDHF) (A : RestrictedDec.Adversary) : ℕ → ℝ :=
  advantage (expTDHF l T A false) (expTDHF l T A true)

/-- Definition 10, p.16: "A perfectly correct TDHF is secure if" every uniform PPT adversary
has negligible advantage. Perfect correctness (Definition 9) is part of the notion. -/
def IsSecureTDHF (l : ℕ → ℕ) (T : TDHF) : Prop :=
  T.PerfectlyCorrect ∧
    ∀ A : RestrictedDec.Adversary, A.Valid → NoisyOWMPC.Negligible (advTDHF l T A)

/-- Definition 2, p.11, with atk = CPA: the base `expCCA2` with no decryption access in either
stage. Invalid messages and exhausted stages output 0 in both experiments. -/
noncomputable def expCPA (n : ℕ → ℕ) (P : RestrictedDec.PKE)
    (A : RestrictedDec.Adversary) (b : Bool) (lam : ℕ) : PMF Bool := do
  let keys ← P.keyLaw lam
  let pre ← runStage A lam (fun _ => none) (A.p.eval lam + 1) []
    (BeyondDS.tup [encNat lam, keys.1])
  match pre.output with
  | none => pure false
  | some out =>
      let ms := BeyondDS.untup out
      let m0 := ms.getD 0 []
      let m1 := ms.getD 1 []
      if m0.length = n lam ∧ m1.length = n lam ∧ m0.length = m1.length then
        let ct ← P.encLaw lam keys.1 (if b then m1 else m0)
        let post ← runStage A lam (fun _ => none) pre.fuel pre.state
          (BeyondDS.tup [ct, pre.state])
        pure ((post.output.getD []).headD false)
      else pure false

noncomputable def advCPA (n : ℕ → ℕ) (P : RestrictedDec.PKE)
    (A : RestrictedDec.Adversary) : ℕ → ℝ :=
  advantage (expCPA n P A false) (expCPA n P A true)

/-- Definition 2, p.11: IND-CPA security. No correctness clause. -/
def INDCPA (n : ℕ → ℕ) (P : RestrictedDec.PKE) : Prop :=
  ∀ A : RestrictedDec.Adversary, A.Valid → NoisyOWMPC.Negligible (advCPA n P A)

/-- Bitwise exclusive or `⊕` of two strings (of equal length wherever it is used). -/
def xorStr (a b : Str) : Str := List.zipWith xor a b

/-- Section A.1, p.32. The encryption randomness is an input `r ∈ D_λ`, drawn by the TDHF
sampler on the encryption coins. The ciphertext `(ct1, ct2)` is the tuple code
`tup [Eval(pk,r), hEval(pk,r) ⊕ m]`. Decryption returns `⊥` when `pInv` does (p.32), and also
when `|ct2| ≠ |z|`, which happens only outside the ciphertext space `C_λ`. -/
def kemPKE (T : TDHF) : RestrictedDec.PKE where
  keyCoins := T.keyCoins
  encCoins := T.sampCoins
  keyGen := T.keyGen
  enc := fun lam pk m r =>
    BeyondDS.tup [T.eval lam pk (T.samp lam r), xorStr (T.hEval lam pk (T.samp lam r)) m]
  dec := fun lam sk c =>
    let fields := BeyondDS.untup c
    let ct1 := fields.getD 0 []
    let ct2 := fields.getD 1 []
    match T.pInv lam sk ct1 with
    | none => none
    | some z => if z.length = ct2.length then some (xorStr z ct2) else none

end TrapdoorHCF.CCA2.Supplement
Source
Kanad Chakravarti, Shreyas Gupta, Bhavana Kanukurthi, Girisha Shankar, Trapdoors Beyond Inversion: Recoverable Information in Public-Key Cryptography, STOC 2027 submission #571 (October 2026; unrefereed), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/571.pdf, Notation 8, p.10; Definition 2, p.11; Definition 10, p.16; Section A.1, p.32

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