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Theorem 6.1, proof — for efficient ψ, (6.3) is solvable iff ψ is the Shapley value on every v_S (Hart–Mas-Colell, Theorem A)

Proved
MondererShapley.Participation.hart_mas_colell_step

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperative-gamesgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1shapley-value

Let ψ\psiψ be an efficient solution and v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N) (so v(∅)=0v(\emptyset) = 0v(∅)=0). Then there is a function PPP on the coalitions of NNN with

P(S)−P(S∖{i})=ψ(vS∪{i})(i)for all S⊆N and every i∈SP(S) - P(S \setminus \{i\}) = \psi(v_{S \cup \{i\}})(i) \qquad \text{for all } S \subseteq N \text{ and every } i \in SP(S)−P(S∖{i})=ψ(vS∪{i}​)(i)for all S⊆N and every i∈S

if and only if ψ\psiψ is the Shapley value on {vS:S∈2N}\{v_S : S \in 2^N\}{vS​:S∈2N}, that is, ψ(vS)(i)=φi(vS)\psi(v_S)(i) = \varphi_i(v_S)ψ(vS​)(i)=φi​(vS​) for every coalition SSS and every i∈Si \in Si∈S, where φ(vS)\varphi(v_S)φ(vS​) is the Shapley value of the restriction of vvv to the player set SSS.

This is the final step of the proof of Theorem 6.1, which the paper takes from Theorem A of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989): a game has a potential whose marginal contributions add up to the worth of every coalition, and those marginal contributions are the Shapley value.

Formalization Note Since i∈Si \in Si∈S, S∪{i}=SS \cup \{i\} = SS∪{i}=S; the page's S∪{i}S \cup \{i\}S∪{i} is kept on the left. ψ(vS)\psi(v_S)ψ(vS​) is ψ S v and φi(vS)\varphi_i(v_S)φi​(vS​) is shapleyOn S v i. Efficiency is assumed for every coalition and every game, as in the paper.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_Solution
import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_shapleyOn
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.Participation

/-- Theorem 6.1, proof, last step (Hart--Mas-Colell 1989, Theorem A): for an efficient solution
`ψ` and a game `v` with `v ∅ = 0`, a function `P` on coalitions with
`P(S) − P(S∖{i}) = ψ(v_{S∪{i}})(i)` for all `S` and `i ∈ S` exists iff `ψ` is the Shapley value
on every subgame `v_S`. -/
theorem hart_mas_colell_step {ι : Type*} [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι) (hψ : IsEfficient ψ)
    (v : Finset ι → ℝ) (hv : v ∅ = 0) :
    (∃ P : Finset ι → ℝ, ∀ S : Finset ι, ∀ i ∈ S, P S - P (S \ {i}) = ψ (S ∪ {i}) v i) ↔
      ∀ S : Finset ι, ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S v i = shapleyOn S v i := by sorry

end MondererShapley.Participation
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 137 (PDF p. 14), proof of Theorem 6.1, last step (Hart and Mas-Colell 1989, Theorem A)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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