Proof of Theorem 1 — correspondence with the auxiliary game
ProvedHartSchmeidler.Finite.aux_game_correspondencecorrelated-equilibriumfinite-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1zero-sum-games
For the finite game described above, a lottery on pure strategy profiles is a correlated equilibrium exactly when it guarantees player I a nonnegative expected payment against every lottery over player II's triples :
Here is the auxiliary payment defined above. This equivalence links the incentive inequalities to the minimax step of the proof.
Formalization Note The triples form one finite strategy set for player II; is one lottery over all triples, not a separate lottery for each player. When there are no players, that set is empty and both sides reduce to the requirement that is a lottery.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.Finite
open Finset
/-- Proof of Theorem 1, p. 19: condition (1) is precisely the guarantee that
player I's mixed strategy earns a nonnegative payoff against every mixed
strategy of player II in the auxiliary game. -/
theorem aux_game_correspondence {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
{S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
(h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (p : (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
IsCorrelatedEq h p ↔ AGT.IsLottery p ∧
∀ y : Deviation S → ℝ, AGT.IsLottery y →
0 ≤ ∑ s, ∑ c, p s * y c * auxPayoff h s c := by sorry
end HartSchmeidler.Finite
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 19, proof of Theorem 1 (‘Consider the following auxiliary’); https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.