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Proof of Proposition 2, p. 37 — at the optimum, f*, p*_d and Π* in the three regimes μ ≤ 1/(2k), 1/(2k) ≤ μ ≤ μ̄, μ ≥ μ̄

Proved
MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits.optimum_values

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticsleakagep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformspricing

In the leakage game with transaction benefit bbb and K(b)=k2b2K(b) = \tfrac{k}{2}b^2K(b)=2k​b2 (see the Setting), let c<vc < vc<v, μ>0\mu > 0μ>0, k>0k > 0k>0, and let (b∗,f∗,pd∗)(b^*, f^*, p_d^*)(b∗,f∗,pd∗​) be an optimum of the game. Then

f∗={b∗if μ≤12k,μ+b∗2if 12k≤μ≤μˉ,v+b∗−cif μ≥μˉ,pd∗={vif μ≤12k,v−μ(2kμ−1)4kμ−1if 12k≤μ≤μˉ,v+c2if μ≥μˉ,f^* = \begin{cases} b^* & \text{if } \mu \le \tfrac{1}{2k}, \\ \mu + \tfrac{b^*}{2} & \text{if } \tfrac{1}{2k} \le \mu \le \bar\mu, \\ v + b^* - c & \text{if } \mu \ge \bar\mu, \end{cases} \qquad p_d^* = \begin{cases} v & \text{if } \mu \le \tfrac{1}{2k}, \\ v - \dfrac{\mu(2k\mu - 1)}{4k\mu - 1} & \text{if } \tfrac{1}{2k} \le \mu \le \bar\mu, \\ \dfrac{v + c}{2} & \text{if } \mu \ge \bar\mu, \end{cases}f∗=⎩⎨⎧​b∗μ+2b∗​v+b∗−c​if μ≤2k1​,if 2k1​≤μ≤μˉ​,if μ≥μˉ​,​pd∗​=⎩⎨⎧​vv−4kμ−1μ(2kμ−1)​2v+c​​if μ≤2k1​,if 2k1​≤μ≤μˉ​,if μ≥μˉ​,​

and the marketplace's equilibrium profit is

Π∗={12kif μ≤12k,μk2k−12μif 12k≤μ≤μˉ,(v−c)(1−v−c2μ)+12k(1−v−c2μ)2if μ≥μˉ,\Pi^* = \begin{cases} \dfrac{1}{2k} & \text{if } \mu \le \tfrac{1}{2k}, \\[6pt] \dfrac{\mu k}{2k - \frac{1}{2\mu}} & \text{if } \tfrac{1}{2k} \le \mu \le \bar\mu, \\[6pt] (v-c)\Bigl(1 - \dfrac{v-c}{2\mu}\Bigr) + \dfrac{1}{2k}\Bigl(1 - \dfrac{v-c}{2\mu}\Bigr)^2 & \text{if } \mu \ge \bar\mu, \end{cases}Π∗=⎩⎨⎧​2k1​2k−2μ1​μk​(v−c)(1−2μv−c​)+2k1​(1−2μv−c​)2​if μ≤2k1​,if 2k1​≤μ≤μˉ​,if μ≥μˉ​,​

where μˉ\bar\muμˉ​ is the threshold of Proposition 2.

These are the equilibrium fee, direct price and profit that accompany the optimal investment b∗b^*b∗.

Formalization Note f∗f^*f∗ is expressed through the optimal b∗b^*b∗ of the same optimum, as on the page. The cases agree at the boundaries μ=1/(2k)\mu = 1/(2k)μ=1/(2k) and μ=μˉ\mu = \bar\muμ=μˉ​; the Lean if takes the earlier case there.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Benefits_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits

/-- Proof of Proposition 2, p. 37: at every optimum `(b*, f*, p*_d)` of the game, the fee, the
direct price and the marketplace's profit take the three-regime values
`f* = b*, μ + b*/2, v + b* − c`, `p*_d = v, v − μ(2kμ − 1)/(4kμ − 1), (v + c)/2` and
`Π* = 1/(2k), μk/(2k − 1/(2μ)), (v − c)(1 − (v − c)/(2μ)) + (1/(2k))(1 − (v − c)/(2μ))²`
for `μ ≤ 1/(2k)`, `1/(2k) ≤ μ ≤ μ̄` and `μ ≥ μ̄` respectively. -/
theorem optimum_values (v c μ k b f pd : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hk : 0 < k)
    (hopt : IsOpt v c μ k b f pd) :
    f = (if μ ≤ 1 / (2 * k) then b
         else if μ ≤ muBar v c k then μ + b / 2
         else v + b - c) ∧
    pd = (if μ ≤ 1 / (2 * k) then v
          else if μ ≤ muBar v c k then v - μ * (2 * k * μ - 1) / (4 * k * μ - 1)
          else (v + c) / 2) ∧
    MProfitB v μ k b f pd =
      (if μ ≤ 1 / (2 * k) then 1 / (2 * k)
       else if μ ≤ muBar v c k then μ * k / (2 * k - 1 / (2 * μ))
       else (v - c) * (1 - (v - c) / (2 * μ)) + 1 / (2 * k) * (1 - (v - c) / (2 * μ)) ^ 2) := by sorry

end MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89c…98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), p. 37, §8.3, Proof of Proposition 2 (displays for f*, p*_d, Π*)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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